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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1995, months after the Supreme Court's landmark decision in United
States v. Lopez,' which held that a federal law was outside the reach of Congressional commerce power for the first time in sixty years, one commentator asked
whether "Farmer Filburn [could] begin raising marijuana or machine guns on
his Ohio farm - as long as he retains the crop for home consumption and as long
as the state of Ohio does not object?" 2 Ten years later, the Supreme Court was
presented with a close variation of that very question. In Gonzales v. Raich,3
four plaintiffs argued that they should be allowed to grow marijuana for their
noncommercial medicinal use without the fear of federal prosecution. By a vote
of 6-3, the Supreme Court held that Congress could regulate the Raich plaintiffs' activity in a decision that is certain to reignite the debate over another
common question from 1995: was Lopez an "epochal case" with far-reaching
4
implications for the scope of the Commerce Clause or was it "only a misstep?

Associate, Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco, California; Law Clerk to the Honorable M.
Blane Michael, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 2004-2005.
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2
Deborah Jones Merritt, COMMERCE!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 675 (1995).
3
125 S. Ct. 2195, 2200 (2005).
4
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 614-15 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also,
e.g., Louis H. Pollak, Symposium, Reflections on United States v. Lopez: Forward,94 MICH. L.
*
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Raich, like Lopez and United States v. Morrison5 before it, provides
mixed signals about what Congress may regulate under its commerce power.
Raich does not directly criticize or question Lopez, which introduced and applied a four-factor test to hold a federal regulation of possession of a gun in a
school zone unconstitutional, or Morrison, a 2000 decision that held the Violence Against Women Act unconstitutional by applying the same test. At the
same time, however, Raich fails to apply, or even mention, the Lopez test, and it
holds that the federal government can regulate both possession and cultivation
of marijuana for personal medicinal use. None of the four opinions in Raichin addition to the majority opinion authored by Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia
wrote a concurring opinion and Justices O'Connor and Thomas each wrote dissents--distinguish possession from cultivation in their analysis. Focusing for
just a moment on the fact that Raich permits federal regulation of simple possession, however, demonstrates how difficult it is to reconcile with Lopez. Lopez
held that the federal government could not regulate possession of a gun in a
school zone because possession is not a commercial activity. Thus, Raich and
Lopez considered nearly identical regulations, to the extent that they both regulated the noncommercial activity of possession, but reached opposite results. On
what basis, then, should courts in the future decide when federal regulation of
noncommercial activity is acceptable under the constitutional and when it isn't?
The Raich majority did not directly address this question, or outline a
framework for analyzing Commerce Clause issues. Instead, it engaged in a
general discussion that appeared to evaluate the case by comparison to the facts
of other cases, as opposed to the rules adopted in those cases. 6 This article analyzes Raich from the perspective of constitutional rules (or tests) and aims to
both critique and make sense of the current state of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. I argue, first, that the Raich majority implicitly relied on two different
constitutional rules in reaching its result and that these rules will remove the
substantive limits Lopez sought to place on Congress' commerce power. At the
same time, Raich's failure to reconcile the rules it relies on with the test Lopez is
bound to cause even more confusion in an already convoluted area of the law.
The article then focuses on Raich's decision not to apply the Lopez test to asapplied challenges. I argue that this approach is inconsistent with the principles
in constitutional litigation that govern the use of as-applied and facial challenges. Courts traditionally favor challenges that attack the validity of a statute
as-applied to the facts in that case (an as-applied challenge) over challenges that
attack the constitutionality of a statute in its entirety (facial challenges). After
Raich, however, facial challenges appear to be the only type of Commerce
Clause challenge that remains viable. Finally, I argue that the Court should
REV. 533, 553 (1995) (considering whether Lopez will have a broad or limited impact and concluding that "there is less in Lopez than meets the eye") (emphasis added).
5
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
6
See infra Part III (analyzing the Raich majority opinion).
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adopt a clearer framework for analyzing and propose the "enterprise theory" as
an approach that would permit as-applied challenges based on Lopez without
unduly restricting Congress' power to regulate local activity under the Commerce Clause.
Part 1I compares the Lopez test with the aggregation rule, which was
first announced in the famous wheat farmer case Wickard v. Filburn.7 This
comparison highlights an underlying tension between the two cases that fueled
the dispute in Raich. With the Lopez and Wickard rules in mind, Part HI provides an analysis of Raich that reveals two doctrinal rules that implicitly served
as the foundation for the Court's decision. The first rule is an expanded interpretation of the aggregation doctrine that either eliminates or severely restricts
the use of as-applied challenges in Commerce Clause cases. The second rule,
which I refer to as the "broader regulatory scheme rule," permits Congress to
pass a regulation, such as the regulation of simple marijuana possession, that
would otherwise be facially unconstitutional under the Lopez test, if the regulation is part of a large regulatory scheme and not a single-subject statute. In Part
IV, I argue that Raich, through these two rules, significantly undermines the
holding in Lopez and, at the same time, adds more confusion to an increasingly
unclear Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Part V argues that, in addition to illuminating the internal conflicts
within Commerce Clause jurisprudence, these constitutional rules highlight an
even more troubling conflict between the Court's approach to commerce cases
and its well-established principles of constitutional adjudication. After Raich,
facial challenges based on the Commerce Clause, in which a litigant contests the
validity of a statute in its entirety, are significantly more likely to succeed than
as-applied challenges that attack a statute only as it applies to the particular circumstances of a case. This is the polar opposite of the traditional approach to
constitutional litigation, in which as-applied challenges are strongly preferred to
facial challenges.
Part VI briefly proposes the "enterprise theory" as an alternative approach for analyzing commerce power issues. I contend that the enterprise theory would provide a superior framework, to both the approach adopted by the
Raich majority and the one advanced by the dissent, for analyzing Commerce
Clause questions. Specifically, I argue that this framework would reconcile the
different pre-Raich rules in a way that would permit as-applied commerce challenges without significantly limiting Congress' Commerce Clause power. Part
VII concludes that the Court should either overrule Raich and adopt a new coherent framework for analyzing commerce challenges or abandon its effort to
place limits on Congress' commerce power and overrule Lopez and Morrison
outright.

7

317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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II. THE AGGREGATION RULE AND THE LOPEZ RULE

The initial shock of Lopez was due almost entirely to the result. Most
academics and lower court judges had long assumed that Congressional power
under the Commerce Clause was, for all practical purposes, limitless and Lopez
suddenly and unexpectedly held it was not.8 Perhaps the most surprising, and
surely most confusing part of Lopez, however, was that the majority reached its
result without claiming to overturn any of the Court's prior cases. After nearly
sixty years without a successful commerce challenge, 9 the Lopez majority acted
as if it were merely following settled Commerce Clause principles despite the
outcome, which strongly indicated the Court was adopting a new course.' 0 The
primary source of confusion in Commerce Clause cases after Lopez was due to
the Court's failure to address the tension between Lopez's rule that limits commerce power based on the distinction between economic and noneconomic activity, and Wickard's aggregation doctrine.
Before Lopez, the aggregation doctrine was the controlling rule for analyzing Commerce Clause issues. The Court first used the aggregation rule in the
1942 case Wickard v. Filburn, which famously upheld federal regulation of an
Ohio farmer's cultivation of wheat for his personal home use. 1 The rule provided that, even if an individual's actions had an impact on commerce that was
"trivial by itself," Congress could regulate them if the "contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated," had a substantial affect on
interstate commerce. 2 This test left Congress with a seemingly infinite commerce power not just because of its terms, but also because it overturned the
prior test that defined the limits of the Commerce Clause, even for as-applied
challenges. In other words, after Wickard commerce challenges were so unsucSee, e.g., Merritt, supra note 2, at 674-75 ("When I graduated from law school in 1980, my
classmates and I believed that Congress could regulate any act-no matter how local-under the
Commerce Clause .... [and] I originally dismissed the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v.
8

Lopez as absurd."); Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y

1, 5 (1995) (wondering "why anyone would make the mistake of calling it the Commerce Clause
instead of the 'Hey-you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like Clause."').
9
See United States v. Taylor, 226 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 2000) ("From 1937 to 1995, the
Supreme Court consistently upheld federal legislation against claims that Congress had overstepped its authority under the Commerce Clause.").
10 The only aspect of the Court's commerce jurisprudence that the Lopez majority acknowledged lacked clarity was whether an activity must "affect" or "substantially affect" interstate
commerce in order for Congress to have the power to regulate it. United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 559 (1995) ("Within this final category, admittedly, our case law has not been clear
whether an activity must 'affect' or 'substantially affect' interstate commerce[.]"). This distinction, however, had little to do with the "commercial" versus "noncommercial" standard announced in Lopez and the fundamental tension between that distinction and Wickard.
II

See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-29.

12 Id. at 127-28 (citing N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941)).
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cessful precisely because there was no standard or constitutional rule upon
which a litigant could base a successful commerce challenge.
Wickard's aggregation rule was the culmination of the Court's rejection
approach to the commerce power.' 3 Before Wickard, the Court
earlier
of its
focused on whether the relationship between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce was "direct" or "indirect."' 4 This test was used to prevent the federal
regulation of purely "intrastate" activity by analyzing the nature of the activity's
impact on commerce.15 So, for example, the indirect-direct distinction kept
Congress from regulating various aspects of the production of goods for interstate commerce under the theory that "[p]roduction is not commerce; but a step
in preparation for commerce., 16 Because the test was concerned with the intrastate character of the regulated activity and the indirect or direct nature of its
effect on commerce, the extent of the impact and, more importantly, whether the
activity was "commercial" or "noncommercial" were irrelevant considerations.
As the Court put it, "[t]he distinction between a direct and an indirect effect
turns, not upon the magnitude of either the cause or the 17effect, but entirely upon
the manner in which the effect has been brought about."'
Examining the relationship between the indirect-direct test and
Wickard's aggregation doctrine demonstrates why Wickard left no Commerce
Clause limits on congressional commerce power. The indirect-direct test circumscribed power under the Commerce Clause based on the local or intrastate
nature of a regulated activity and the way in which it affected interstate commerce. Wickard held that Congress could regulate the actions of just one individual "even if [they] be local and . . . irrespective of whether such effect is8
what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.""
Thus, the aggregation rule did away with the direct-indirect test, thereby removing entirely the previous limits on the commerce power. In the void of the indirect and direct test, the aggregation doctrine instructed courts to consider only
whether the actions of an individual, "taken together with [those] of many others
similarly situated, [was] far from trivial."' 9 If the aggregate impact was "far
13

See Jones v. Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding application of the National

Labor Relations Act to a steel producer with facilities across the country that produced goods

primarily for sale in interstate commerce); Darby, 312 U.S. at 117 (adopting an affects test where
activity can be regulated if "it is so related to the commerce and so affects it as to be within the

reach of the power of Congress to regulate it").
14

See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
See id. at 546 ("In determining how far the federal government may go in controlling intrastate transactions upon the ground that they 'affect' interstate commerce, there is a necessary and
well-established distinction between direct and indirect effects.").
15

16

Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936) (citing Chassaniol v. Greenwood, 291

U.S. 584, 587 (1934)).
Id. at 308.
17

18

See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120, 125 (1942).

Id. at 127-28 (citing N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941)).
19
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from trivial," Congress' could regulate even the smallest instance of the activity.
As a practical matter, this new rule could always be satisfied;20 the Supreme
Court rejected every commerce challenge it considered under the aggregation
rule.2 '
An overlooked aspect of Wickard's shift away from the indirect test is
that the aggregation rule functioned largely by eliminating even as-applied
Commerce Clause challenges. It was irrelevant whether an individual's actions
were local or whether they had any effect on interstate commerce-whether
direct or indirect-on their own, so long as her actions, combined with the actions of similarly situated individuals, had even an indirect affect on commerce. 22 In other words, if a litigant attempted to argue that a statute was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause as-applied to his actions, the court
would nevertheless consider the actions of all others engaged in the same activity. At that point, the only remaining requirement was that the activity, taken as
a whole, have some impact on commerce. This requirement was, of course, met
in every case because every activity impacts commerce if it is generally defined.23 Thus, the aggregation doctrine left no limit on Congress' commerce
power, either as-applied to particular litigants or to statutes as a whole. Because
the aggregation doctrine prevented both facial and as-applied commerce challenges from succeeding, the doctrine's treatment of as-applied challenges was
itself unexceptional. Following Lopez, however, the treatment of as-applied
challenges under the aggregation doctrine became an essential, though still
largely unnoticed, source of confusion in analyzing commerce challenges.
As already noted, Lopez and Morrison claimed to remain faithful to
post-Wickard Commerce Clause jurisprudence and keep the aggregation rule in
tact. 24 At the same time, however, the cases adopted and applied an entirely
new Commerce Clause rule. The new Lopez rule came in the form of a fourpart test 2 5 that considers (1) the economic nature of the regulated activity, (2)
whether the statute contains an express jurisdictional element to limit its reach,
20
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995) ("[D]epending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial.").
21

See supra note 9.

22

Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28.

23

See supra note 20.

24

See Christy H. Dral & Jerry J.Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of United

States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605, 616-17 (2001) ("With one

hand the majority refuses to relinquish the rational basis test, while with the other hand the majority strikes down legislation with standards that clearly are stricter than rational basis.").
25
In addition to the four-part test, the Court appeared to emphasize the "traditional state interest" but did not clarify how the consideration weighed in the new test. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561
n.3 (noting that states have primary authority over criminal law); see also id. at 577 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.").
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(3) whether the statute's legislative history contains congressional findings on
the impact of the regulated activity on interstate commerce, and (4) whether the
effects of the regulated activity on interstate commerce are attenuated. 26 Of
these factors, the test places particular emphasis on the economic (commercial)
nature of the activity and whether it has an attenuated relationship with commerce. As the Lopez and Morrison majority put it, regulation of "economic
activity" that "substantially affects interstate commerce ... will be sustained,""
while regulation of noncommercial activity will almost certainly not.28
Despite the Lopez and Morrison majority's statements that the aggregation doctrine remained good law, the new economic-based rule seemed to replace the aggregation doctrine as the controlling method for analyzing Commerce Clause issues, at least in some instances. As the Court put it in Morrison,
"[wihile we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of
any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity
only where that activity is economic in nature., 29 Although the Lopez rule appeared to limit the reach of the aggregation rule, neither Lopez nor Morrison
provided any discussion of how to reconcile the two rules or guidance on when
one or the other would control in a particular case. This presented an especially
difficult problem in instances where an individual's actions were noncommercial but the activity regulated by the terms of the statute was commercial. Because Lopez and Morrison applied the four-part test to strike down statutes in
their entirety, 30 neither case directly questioned the aggregation rule's method of
precluding as-applied challenges and considering activity only in the aggregate.
Indeed, Lopez and Morrison did not discuss at all whether or how the fourfactor test might be used in an as-applied challenge, where a statute regulated
commercial activity on its face but the individual's actions that were covered by
the statute were noncommercial. Should courts apply the Lopez test to the "aggregate" activity or the individual activity?
The Court's only attempt to distinguish the aggregation rule from the
new test came in a cryptic statement in Lopez that "[e]ven Wickard, which is
perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a
gun in a school zone does not."'', That claim is especially curious, however,
because Wickard itself involved noncommercial activity 32 and applied the ag-

28

See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-13 (2000).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
See Morrison,529 U.S. at 613.

29

Id.

26
27

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549 (holding the Gun Free School Zone Act unconstitutional); Morrison,
529 U.S. at 598 (holding the Violence Against Women Act unconstitutional).
31
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
32
Indeed, Wickard seemed to treat the noncommercial nature of Filburn's actions as an important fact of the case. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118 (1942) ("The question would
30
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gregation doctrine to uphold "marketing quotas [that] not only embrace all that
33
may be sold without penalty but also what may be consumed on the premises.
In fact, the Wickard Court characterized the regulated activity in that case as
something that "may not be regarded as commerce ' 34 and noted that the case
involved wheat "that is never marketed" and only "supplies a need of the man
who grew it."'35 Lopez provided only a brief discussion elaborating on its claim
that Wickard was distinguishable because it "involved economic activity in a
way that possession of a gun in a school zone does not" and did not attempt to
directly explain the statement.3 6 Instead, Lopez quickly reviewed the facts of
Wickard and noted that Filbum sold part of the wheat he had grown and put part
of it to personal use.37 The Court then quoted a passage from Wickard on the
purpose of the Act and the need to regulate even wheat grown for personal use
in order to achieve the goal of price regulation.38 The discussion ended with a
conclusory statement that the GFSZA was "a criminal statute that by its terms
has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms [and] is not an essentialpart of a larger
regulationof economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. 39
The Court's failure to adequately explain the relationship between its
rule and the aggregation doctrine was the central cause of confusion in lower
courts over the scope of congressional power following Lopez and Morrison,
and was the animating force behind the dispute in Raich.4° At its core, Raich
was about how the fundamental inconsistencies between the Wickard and Lopez
rules should be resolved and, in particular, how the Lopez rule should be applied
to (1) a noncommercial activity if the statute regulating it covers generally
commercial activity and (2) a generally noncommercial activity that is regulated
as part of a broad regulatory scheme aimed at commercial activity.

merit little consideration since our decision in United States v. Darby, sustaining the federal power
to regulate production of goods for commerce, except for the fact that this Act extends federal
regulation of production not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the
farm.").
33 Id. at 119.
34 Id. at 125.
35 Id. at 128.
36
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
37

Id.

Id. at 560-61.
39 Id. at 561 (emphasis added). See also id. ("It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases
upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.").
40
See infra Part III.
38
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The facts in Raich fell almost perfectly into the area of tension between
the Wickard and Lopez rules. Raich involved two medical marijuana patients,
Angel McClary Raich and Dianne Monson, and two caregivers, 4 1 both litigating
as John Does.4 2 Monson cultivated her own marijuana while the John Does
provided Raich, who was unable to grow her own due to the seriousness of her
medical condition, with marijuana free of charge.43 Monson and the John Does
all grew their marijuana exclusively using materials from California" and all of
their activity was lawful under state law, pursuant to California's Compassionate Use Act. 45 After the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) seized six
marijuana plants from Monson's home in 2002, the four plaintiffs filed suit,
seeking an injunction to prevent the federal government from enforcing the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) against them for possessing or cultivating
marijuana for their personal medical use. 46
The Raich case involved a noncommercial instance of cultivation,
which is generally a commercial endeavor, as well as possession, a generally
noncommercial activity that the federal government regulated as part of a broad
scheme to control the market for marijuana in its entirety. Coincidentally, cultivation and possession were also the activities at issue in Wickard and Lopez
respectively. Thus, Raich turned on how to reconcile the Lopez test and
Wickard's aggregation doctrine, the central question left unanswered in Lopez
and Morrison. Relying on Lopez and Morrison, the plaintiffs argued that they
were engaged in noncommercial, intrastate activity that fell outside the scope of
Congress' Commerce Clause power.47 The government did not dispute that the
plaintiffs activity, taken alone, was intrastate and noncommercial.4 8 Instead, it
41 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(e) (West Supp. 2005) (defining a medical marijuana caregiver under California's Compassionate Use Act).
42
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2200 (2005).
43
Id. For a detailed account of Raich and Monson's medical conditions, see Brief for Respondents at 4-6, Ashcroft v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (No. 03-1454) [hereinafter Brief for
Respondents].
44
Brief for Respondents, supra note 43, at 6 (noting that the plaintiff's medical "cannabis is
grown using only soil, water, nutrients, equipment, supplies, and lumber originating from or
manufactured within California").
45
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2005). Passed by California voters in
a 1996 ballot initiative, the Compassionate Use Act exempts medical marijuana patients and their
caregivers from other state drug laws. Id. The exemption is subject to limitations, such as a physician's recommendation. Id.
46
Brief for Respondents, supra note 43, at 7.
47
Id. at 12-34.
48
See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 21, Ashcroft v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (No. 031454) ("[T]he fact that respondents' conduct is not only intrastate, but also purportedly limited to
distribution and possession for personal use, does not eliminate Congress's authority.") [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners].
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relied on Wickard and argued that the plaintiffs actions could be regulated because the manufacture and possession of marijuana were economic activities in
a general
sense and the CSA was generally aimed at regulating economic activ49
ity.

Throughout the case, the tension between Lopez and Wickard manifested itself in a dispute over what the proper "class of activity" was for purposes of applying the Lopez four-part test. The government argued that the
Commerce Clause analysis should be based on the activity regulated by the
CSA as a whole, 50 namely all marijuana-related activity. Raich argued that the
analysis should focus on a smaller "class of activity"-the noncommercial, intrastate, medical marijuana activity authorized by California law.51 Under the
government's definition, a Court would first consider the CSA as a whole and
then ask whether it was reasonable to include the plaintiffs' activity in the broad
class of activities regulated by the CSA.52 Raich's definition, by contrast, would
lead a court to apply the four-part Lopez test to the narrow class of activity,
thereby rendering the other aspects of the CSA irrelevant to the analysis.53 The
Ninth Circuit panel majority sided with Raich and the dissent agreed with the
government. 54 The majority found that Raich's conduct constituted a "separate
and distinct class of activities: the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and
possession of cannabis for personal medical purposes as recommended by a
patient's physician pursuant to valid California state law."5 5 It then applied Lopez's test to that class of activity and held that the CSA was unconstitutional as
applied to the Raich plaintiffs.56 The dissent argued that the majority had
adopted the wrong definition, noting that "[tihe Wickard Court could easily
'the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation
have defined the class of activities as 57
of wheat for personal food purposes."
While the Ninth Circuit focused on how to define the class of activity
for purposes of applying the Lopez test, Justice Stevens, writing for the Raich
majority, did not apply the Lopez test, or even mention it at all. Instead, Stevens
employed a generalized analysis that did not explicitly adopt any particular test
or framework of analysis and touched on the class of activity dispute only in
49

See id. at 21.

50

See id. at 13-22.

51

See Brief for Respondents, supra note 43, at 19.
See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 48, at 37.

52

See Brief for Respondents, supra note 43, at 23.
54 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003).
55 Id. at 1228.
56
Id. at 1234 ("[W]e find that the CSA, as applied to the appellants, is likely unconstitutional."). Because Raich involved the grant of a preliminary injunction, the question was whether
application of the CSA was likely unconstitutional or unconstitutional. This posture, of course,
did not impact the central interpretation of law adopted by the Ninth Circuit majority.
57 Id. at 1238 (Beam, J.,
dissenting).
53
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rebutting the Ninth Circuit's approach. Stevens claimed to base his analysis on
the overall premise that regulating intrastate marijuana cultivation and possession was "a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in
that product. '58 The analysis began with a comparison between Wickard and
Raich, in which
Stevens argued that the similarities between the two cases were
"striking," 59 and concluded that, consistent with Wickard's reasoning, Congress
could reach the Raich plaintiffs activity as part of its effort "to regulate the interstate market in a fungible commodity., 60 After reaching this conclusion, the
opinion continued by distinguishing Lopez and Morrison on the grounds that the
"CSA is a statute that directly regulates economic, commercial activity," 6' while
the regulations struck down in Lopez and Morrison were not part of a statutory
scheme that regulated economic activity. Justice Stevens did not explain with
precision the relevance of this distinction, acknowledge that Raich's individual
actions were noncommercial, or outline the factors future courts should use
when determining whether Congress can and cannot regulate noncommercial
activity. Indeed, the word "noncommercial" appears only three times in the
majority's opinion--each time as part of the same quote from the Ninth Circuit's decision in which it defined, what it believed was the relevant "class of
activity" for purposes of the Commerce Clause analysis.62
Though Justice Stevens did not address the class of activity question as
a central part of his analysis, his brief discussion of the issue as well as his general approach seemed to adopt a view similar to the government's, though not
quite as sweeping. His treatment of the class of activities issue came in criticizing the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Ninth Circuit was able to reach its result,
he argued, "only by isolating a 'separate and distinct' class of activities that it
held beyond the reach of federal power. '' 63 Stevens concluded that this approach was misguided because "Congress acted rationally in determining that
none of the characteristics making up the purported class, whether viewed individually or in the aggregate, compelled an exemption from the CSA." 64 Although Justice Stevens did not focus on the class of activities issue in depth, his
adoption of a broad view implicitly served as a foundation for his opinion. Justice O'Connor's chief criticism of the majority's approach, which she described
as a "problem endemic to the Court's opinion, 65 was that it "shift[ed the] focus
from that activity at issue in this case to the entirety of what the CSA regu58

Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2211 (2005).

59

Id. at 2206.

60

Id. at 2209.

61

Id.at 2211.

62

Id. at 2201, 2211, 2215. The majority uses the word "noneconomic" only once, when quot-

ing from Morrison. Id. at 2210.
63
Id. at 2211.
64

65

Id.
Id. at 2224 (O'Connor,J.,
dissenting).
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lates.,, 66 She argued that the majority "t[ook] its cues from Congress" '67 in defining the relevant conduct at issue in the case and that, by "allowing Congress to
set the terms of debate in this way," the Court's holding was "tantamount to
removing meaningful limits on the Commerce Clause. 68
Despite the fundamental role the definition of the class of activity
played in Raich, none of the Supreme Court Justices viewed the distinction between possession and cultivation as important in isolating the activity to be analyzed. 69 The same was true of both parties and of the lower courts.70 This is
noteworthy because it would seem natural to analyze possession and cultivation
differently. After all, if anything about the Commerce Clause was certain before Raich, it was that Wickard upheld the federal regulation of an individual
instance of wheat cultivation 7' and Lopez struck down a statute that regulated
possession of a gun in a school zone.72 This is not to say that the Court should
have resolved the case by allowing the federal government to reach the plaintiff's cultivation but not their possession, but merely that it is odd none of the
opinions analyzed or discussed each activity separately. In particular, although
the majority mentioned possession and manufacture independent of one another
at times, it claimed to uphold regulation of both for the same reason, namely
that they could be regulated as part of a broad regulatory scheme because
"[p]rohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in
that product., 73 But, with the different treatment of cultivation in Wickard and
possession in Lopez in mind, a close analysis of the majority's reasoning reveals
that it implicitly relied on two distinct sub-rules to uphold regulation of cultivation and possession. First, the majority used Wickard's aggregation doctrine in
declining to apply the Lopez rule to Raich's individual act of cultivation on the
theory that cultivation, in the aggregate, is an economic activity.74 Second,
Raich relied on a new rule to permit federal regulation of possession, an activity
that is generally noneconomic.75 Both rules fit within the majority's broader
reasoning but each has different implications for analyzing Commerce Clause
cases in the future and predicting the breadth of Congress' commerce power
after Raich.

66
67

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 2222.

68

Id.

69

See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003).
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942).
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995).

70

71
72

74

Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211.
See id. at 2206-07.

75

See id. at 2211-15.

73
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Justice Stevens' application of the aggregation doctrine resolved the
question of whether the Lopez rule was limited to facial challenges or should
also be used in as-applied challenges. Despite Morrison's statement implying
76
that the Court would not aggregate the effects of noncommercial activity, Justice Stevens relied on the aggregation rule to hold that Congress could indeed
"regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic 'class of activities.' ' 77 In other words, Raich held that a plaintiff cannot bring an as-applied
challenge based on the rule in Lopez because the aggregation doctrine allows
Congress to regulate individual instances of noncommercial activity if the activity, in general, is commercial. This interpretation of the aggregation doctrine
was sufficient by itself to support the Court's upholding the federal regulation of
Raich's cultivation as constitutional, because production is an economic activity
generally.7 8 Justice Stevens' discussion of the similarities between Wickard and
Raich demonstrates his use of the aggregation doctrine to uphold regulation of
Raich's cultivation and implicitly justify his failure to apply the Lopez rule. He
began the aggregation discussion by noting that "[l]ike the farmer in Wickard,
respondents are cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible commodity for
which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market., 79 And, after discussing the similar market forces at work, he concluded that in "both cases, the
regulation is squarely within Congress' commerce power because production of
the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a
substantial effect on supply and demand of the national market." 80 On this interpretation, an activity must be noncommercial, in the aggregate, in order for
the Lopez rule to apply. Because cultivation is an economic activity in general,
this interpretation meant that Raich could not win on her cultivation claim.
Tellingly, Stevens did not mention possession even once in his comparison of Raich to Wickard.81 This is because the aggregation doctrine itself did
not provide a sufficient basis for upholding federal regulation of Raich's possession. The aggregation doctrine, as interpreted by Raich, functions by precluding
76

See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("While we need not adopt a cate-

gorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these
cases, thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld regulation of intrastate activity only
where that activity is economic in nature.").
77
Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2205 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971); Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942)). Although the opinion says "local," the context indicates
that the court uses local as shorthand for "noncommercial." This occurs throughout the opinion.
78
See id. at 2211 (defining economics as "'the production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities"') (quoting WEBSTER'S TMRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)). Possession is absent from this list.
79
Id. at 2206 (emphasis added). See also id. ("Wickard thus establishes that Congress can
regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself 'commercial,' in that it is not produced for sale,
if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the
interstate market in that commodity.").
80
Id. at 2207 (emphasis added).
81
See id. at 2206-09.
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as-applied challenges based on the Lopez rule on the basis that the general regulation is valid. Unlike cultivation, possession is not an economic activity, even
generally.82 Although the Raich plaintiffs did not bring a facial challenge to the
CSA's prohibition against marijuana possession 83 the majority could not have
upheld the constitutionality of the CSA as-applied to the plaintiffs' possession if
the possession provision were unconstitutional on its face. This was a problem
in Raich because, if simple application of the aggregation doctrine could save a
statute that regulated possession, Lopez would surely have been decided differently. Justice Stevens did not directly acknowledge this problem but his discussion distinguishing Lopez and Morrison reveals the rule that he adopted to solve
84
it.
Stevens argued that the "Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990... was a
brief, single-subject statute ...[that] did not regulate any economic activity. 85
The CSA was "at the opposite end of the regulatory spectrum... a lengthy and
detailed statute creating a comprehensive framework for regulating the produc86
tion, distribution, and possession of five classes of 'controlled substances.'
Thus, "unlike the discrete prohibition established by the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990," Stevens concluded that the CSA's provisions were each "'essential part[s] of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. 87 As
noted above, the larger regulatory scheme concept was mentioned in Lopez but
left entirely undefined.88 Under the interpretation adopted by Justice Stevens,
single-subject regulations that would be vulnerable under the Lopez rule, are
constitutional if they are part of a larger regulatory scheme and rationally related
to achieving the ends of the scheme. Whereas the aggregation doctrine prevents
an as-applied challenge if the general activity can be regulated under the Commerce Clause, the broader scheme doctrine concerns the facial validity of a
regulation; it prevents even a successful facial challenge to a regulation based
on Lopez if that regulation is part of a broader regulatory scheme.89
Justice Thomas' interpretation of the majority's opinion is consistent
with the argument that the Raich majority's opinion implicitly rested on these
two rules. Thomas observed in dissent that the majority gave three reasons to
See, e.g., id. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that "simple possession is a noneconomic activity" but finding that fact "immaterial to whether it can be prohibited as a necessary
part of a larger regulation"); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995) (finding possession
of a gun in a school zone to be noncommercial activity).
83
Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2204 ("Nor do they contend that any provision or section of the CSA
amounts to an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority.").
84
See id. at 2209.
82

85

Id.

86

Id. at 2210.

Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
88 See generally Alex Kreit, Why is Congress Still Regulating Noncommercial Activity?, 28
HARv. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 169 (2004) (discussing the broader regulatory scheme doctrine).
89
See infra Part IV.A (analyzing the broader scheme rule).
87
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support its conclusion: "First, respondent's conduct, taken in the aggregate, may
substantially affect interstate commerce; second, regulation of the respondents'
conduct is essential to regulating the interstate marijuana market; and, third,
regulation of respondents' conduct is incidental to regulating the interstate marijuana market." 9 He did not discuss the implications of each reason separately,
or characterize them as distinct rules; the observation was only part of a brief
overview of the majority's approach. The reasons identified by Thomas, however, track the two rules identified above. The first reason listed by Justice
Thomas mirrors the aggregation doctrine, while the second and third reasons
form the "broader scheme" rule. So, although the Raich majority did not explicitly identify any rules, or even a general framework, that grounds its approach
and, instead, appeared to rely on a generalized argument that Congress can
reach noncommercial intrastate activity in connection with its valid purpose of
regulating the interstate drug market, these two distinct rules animate this reasoning and will shape its application.
Isolating the two rules used in Raich is helpful to understanding the
scope of the commerce power, and, similarly, what meaning Lopez's rule
against the regulation of noncommercial activity might retain, after Raich. The
analysis reveals that Raich turns Lopez's substantive limitations on what activities Congress can constitutionally regulate into procedural limits that Congress
will generally be able to easily overcome. Moreover, Raich suffers from a
number of unexplained inconsistencies with Lopez and Morrison that are sure to
cause confusion for courts trying to determine what rule to apply in analyzing
Commerce Clause questions. Finally, Raich's treatment of the rule announced
in Lopez and Morrison is difficult to reconcile with the Court's basic principles
of constitutional adjudication. In particular, the majority's failure to apply Lopez's rule to the particular activity involved in Raich conflicts with the rule that
as-applied challenges are preferred to facial challenges.
IV.A LIMITLESs COMMERCE POWER

Raich yields a Commerce Clause jurisprudence with three basic overlapping doctrinal rules. First, there is Lopez's four-part test. Although the
Raich majority did not apply or mention Lopez's test, it treated Lopez as established law and did not claim to overrule either Lopez or Morrison. Second,
Wickard's aggregation rule remains good law and, after Raich, operates to limit,
or perhaps forbid entirely, the use of as-applied commerce challenges. At the
very least, Raich does not recognize as-applied challenges based on the fourpart Lopez test. Third, Raich creates an entirely new "broader scheme" test,
based on language from Lopez, which upholds regulations that would fail the
Lopez test as single-subject regulations, if the regulations are part of a broader
regulatory scheme. The second and third rules both significantly limit the reach
90

Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2234 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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of Lopez's rule, by making it inapplicable in a large number of circumstances.
Raich's failure to clearly announce a framework of analysis makes it difficult to
predict exactly how the rules will function and interact in the future. But,
Raich's use of the aggregation doctrine and the broader scheme rule demonstrates that, at a minimum, Lopez's substantive limits on congressional commerce power are now largely only procedural limits. This is because, after
Raich, Lopez's test only applies in a very limited circumstance: facial challenges
to stand-alone regulations. This section considers the scope of the commerce
power after Raich and examines what issues are most likely to present close
commerce questions in the future. Part A focuses on the broader scheme rule
and Part B on the aggregation rule.
A.

The BroaderScheme Doctrine

The most striking aspect of Raich, with respect to its practical implications for the scope of the commerce power, is that it upheld the CSA's regulation of simple possession of marijuana. This is because, under that holding,
Congress can regulate generally noncommercial activity in some circumstances,
even if a straightforward application of the Lopez test would have placed the
activity outside federal reach. Raich does not clearly explain how courts in the
future should decide whether a regulation of a noncommercial activity, like possession, is valid under Raich or invalid under Lopez. But, wherever the line is
drawn, the debate in future cases will focus on whether a regulation is an "essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulation
would be undercut unless the [noncommercial] activity were regulated." 9' As
discussed above, the Court's reliance on the broader scheme concept to distinguish Lopez and Morrison unmistakably singles it out as the method for determining which congressional regulations of generally noncommercial activity are
valid exercises of the commerce power and which are not. An examination of
this rule shows that, at a minimum, it significantly limits the reach of Lopez and
Morrison by turning substantive limits on the commerce power into procedural
limits and indicates the difficult issues courts will face in determining where
Lopez's test ends and the broader scheme rule begins.
At the most basic level, Raich's broader scheme rule permits Congress
to overcome Lopez's limits in at least some instances by including regulations
that target noncommercial activity within a broad regulatory scheme. This
alone removes Lopez and Morrison's substantive limits on the commerce power
as a practical matter. For example, after Raich, Congress could constitutionally
pass the exact same regulation struck down in Lopez by enacting a broad regulatory scheme aimed at eliminating illegal interstate commerce in guns, 92 criminalizing gun possession as part of the effort and including a penalty enhance91

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.

92

Putting aside, of course, any Second Amendment concerns.
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ment for offenses in a school zone.93 As Justice O'Connor put it in dissent,
Raich turns Lopez into "little more than a drafting guide" 94 because Congress
can circumvent the Lopez test by placing regulations that would be unconstitutional on their own in a broad scheme. Thus, the broader scheme doctrine turns
the focus of the Commerce Clause away from what Congress may regulate to
how Congress may regulate. This result conflicts with Lopez's focus on limiting
what activities Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause 95 and might
even give Congress a "perverse incentive to legislate broadly pursuant to the
Commerce Clause-nestling questionable assertions of its authority into comprehensive regulatory schemes"[.], 96 It is important to emphasize that the
broader scheme rule will have this effect regardless of how any of the questions
left unanswered in Raich are resolved. This is because, even if the broader
scheme is given a very limited interpretation, it is still, at its core, a rule that
permits Congress to pass regulations that would be unconstitutional as standalone statues by including them in a "broader regulatory scheme."
Although the broader scheme rule will undoubtedly permit Congress to
regulate almost any activity so long as it does so in a certain way, the drafting
requirements the rule places on Congress are far from clear. First, as Justice
O'Connor noted, it is difficult to reconcile Raich's broader scheme rule with
Lopez because the GFSZA was itself attached to a scheme of gun regulation that
targeted the sale of guns to minors. O'Connor argues that "[a]ccording to the
Court's and concurrence's logic ... the Lopez court should have reasoned that
the prohibition on gun possession in school zones could be an appropriate
means of effectuating a related prohibition on 'sell[ing]' or 'deliver[ing]' firearms or ammunition to 'any individual who a licensee knows or has reasonable
cause to believe is less than eighteen years of age.' 97 The majority inexplicably
failed to address this point, and Justice O'Connor did not discuss it at length, but
it is particularly important to understanding the contours of the broader scheme
rule.

93

Kreit, supra note 88, at 171. See also United States v. Adams, 343 F.3d 1024, 1033 n.10
(9th Cir. 2003) (adopting a similar interpretation of the broader scheme doctrine and concluding
that "there is little doubt that if Congress had intended to eliminate the interstate market for guns.
.. Congress could proscribe the intrastate possession of firearms").
94
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2218 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
95
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 ("Thus, if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we
are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate"); see also id. ("Again, Justice Breyer's rationale lacks any real limits because, depending on
the level of generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial.").
96
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also Adrian Vermeule, Does
Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects?, 46 VILL. L. REv. 1325 (2001) (arguing that the
broader scheme doctrine creates perverse incentives for Congress to regulate broadly); Kreit,
supra note 88, at 185 (same).
97
See id. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1988)).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2006

17

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 108, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 9
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108

In his concurrence, Justice Scalia offered a brief attempt to reconcile
Raich's broader scheme rule with the result in Lopez in a footnote. 98 Scalia argued that Lopez was unlike Raich because "it is .
difficult to imagine what
intelligible scheme of regulation of the interstate market in guns could have as
an appropriate means of effectuation the prohibition of guns within 1000 feet of
schools (and nowhere else)." 99 More specifically, Scalia contended that Justice
O'Connor's argument was unpersuasive because "the relationship between the
regulatory scheme ...[which] require[s] all dealers in firearms that have traveled in interstate commerce to be licensed ... and the statute at issue in Lopez
approaches the nonexistent. ' °° In other words, according to Scalia, the GFSZA
was not saved by the broader scheme rule because it did not have a sufficiently
close connection to the scheme's goal of licensing. The problem with this argument is that it mistakenly treats gun licensing as the goal of the scheme when
that was not the scheme's purpose at all. The goal of the scheme was to regulate and restrict the sale of guns to certain groups of people, such as minorslicensing was merely a means to achieve those ends. So, although the prohibition of gun possession in school zones is not related to effectuating a licensing
program, both are rationale means for Congress to "effectuate its objective"10'
of eliminating the interstate market for the sale of guns to minors. In short, Justice Scalia's distinction does not address why the GSFZA was not an "appropriate means of achieving the legitimate
end of eradicating [the sale of guns to
10 2
minors] from interstate commerce."
This fundamental problem raises the question of whether Lopez and
Raich can be reconciled at all. It also highlights the difficulty future courts will
face in determining how to apply the broader scheme rule and, in particular,
what limits, if any, the rule has. The rule itself implies two considerations or
factors courts might use in analyzing broader scheme issues. First, the "larger
regulatory scheme" language itself indicates that the breadth of the scheme
could play an important role. At the very least, the language seems to mean that
a stand-alone regulation will not be protected by the test. But, what about a
"scheme" that consists of only two provisions, or three provisions? In other
words, if size is an important factor, how should courts determine what constitutes "a larger regulation of economic activity?"'' 0 3 The inquiry would almost
certainly be an exercise in arbitrary line-drawing. Fortunately, despite the "larger scheme" language, Raich's application of the broader scheme doctrine indicates the schemes' size carries little, if any, weight. Although Raich mentions

98

Id. at 2220 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring).

99
Id.
1oo Id.

101 Id. at 2219.

Id.
103 Id. at 2209 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
102
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that the CSA is a "comprehensive" '1° 4 scheme in its discussion and contrasts it
with the "brief, single-subject statute',' 0 5 in Lopez, its analysis is not based on
the CSA's size. Indeed, the size of the statute would seem to be a peculiar basis
for deciding whether to uphold or strike down a regulation. If, for example,
Congress passed a large regulatory scheme that regulated only noncommercial
activity and contained a preamble stating that Congress "recognizes all of the
activity regulated by the statute is noncommercial in nature and only tenuously
connected to interstate commerce but can properly regulate it in this broad
scheme," it seems unlikely that the Court would find it constitutional, even if it
had 500 different provisions. In other words, if all of the activity regulated is
noncommercial and the purpose behind the regulation is invalid, why should the
size of the regulatory scheme make any difference?
Instead of focusing on the size of the CSA, the Court focused on the relationship between the CSA's purpose and its regulation of noncommercial activity. For example, the Court emphasized that "[p]rohibiting the [noncommercial] intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational
(and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in that product."' 6 In
other words, the inquiry underlying the broader scheme doctrine in Raich appeared to focus on the importance of the potentially unconstitutional provision
to achieving the scheme's "legitimate" purpose. 0 7 This reasoning is built on the
argument that the broader scheme's purpose could be "undercut" if the suspect
regulation were removed. Importantly, under this view, a regulation is defined
as "essential" in relation to the valid purpose of the scheme. Thus, Raich holds
that regulating marijuana possession is an essential part of the CSA because it is
a "rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in [marijuana].' ' 8 Scalia's attempt at distinguishing Lopez from Raich also supports
this reading of the broader scheme rule as he contended the key difference was
that the GFSZA did not have a sufficiently close relationship to the purpose of
the broader scheme.
Reading the broader scheme rule as concerned with the relationship between the purpose of the scheme and the suspect regulation seems to be the
most sensible interpretation of the doctrine. But, if the key considerations are
whether the congressional purpose is legitimate and whether the questionable
regulation is closely related to that purpose, why should the existence of a
104

Id. at 2211.

105

Id. at 2209.
Id. at 2211; see also id. at 2209. ("Given the ...

106

concerns about diversion [of marijuana]

into illicit channels, we have no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for belieiving that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave
a gaping hole in the CSA.").
107 See id. at 2212 ("The congressional judgment that an exemption for [intrastate noncommercial marijuana activity] would undermine the orderly enforcement of the entire regulatory scheme
is entitled to a strong presumption of validity.").
108 ld. at 2211.
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scheme matter at all? One could argue that regulating sale in combination with
possession is a more effective way to regulate commerce in a product than regulating possession alone. But, Congress' decision not to regulate sale or distribution of a good does not impact the conclusion that regulating possession of a
good is a rational means of regulating commerce in that good. Thus, the justification for permitting Congress to regulate possession in Raich would seem to
apply with equal force to a single subject statute that regulates possession, so
long as it was enacted to effectuate a legitimate purpose. If, as Raich indicates,
the broader scheme rule exists to ensure Congress can choose its preferred
means to achieve a legitimate end, why should Congress have to choose between a broad scheme that regulates every aspect of a market or nothing? Why
shouldn't Congress be able to decide that a statute forbidding gun possession in
a school zone is a better way to regulate the interstate market for the sale of
guns to minors than a broad scheme that might place additional burdens on legitimate gun sales? This is not to argue that Raich will or should permit a single-subject regulation of noncommercial activity, especially since it claims to
leave Lopez as good law. But the fact that the reasoning underlying the Court's
interpretation of the broader scheme doctrine seems to apply with equal force to
a stand alone regulation as it does to one included in a broad scheme, highlights
a key problem courts are likely to face in attempting to construct a principled
limit to the reach of the broader scheme rule. Courts applying the broader
scheme rule in the future will have to determine both whether, and to what extent, the breadth of the scheme at issue matters, and the extent to which Congressional purpose can save an otherwise unconstitutional regulation.
B.

The Aggregation Doctrine

As discussed above, the scope of the commerce power was so expansive
after Wickard in large part because the aggregation doctrine eliminated even asapplied Commerce Clause challenges. Before Wickard, the controlling Commerce Clause test focused on the intrastate, local character of an activity as a
limit on congressional commerce power. 1°9 Wickard held that even the most
local, intrastate activity could be regulated so long as the activity, in the aggregate, had an affect of commerce.'" 0 Lopez created a new Commerce Clause test
focused on whether the regulated activity was commercial or noncommercial in
the context of a facial challenge but did not indicate whether that test would be
employed in as-applied challenges or discuss how it related to the aggregation
doctrine. This raised the question of whether the Lopez rule applied to individual noncommercial activity or only activity that was noncommercial in the ag109

See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935) ("In deter-

mining how far the federal government may go in controlling intrastate transactions upon the
ground that they 'affect' interstate commerce, there is a necessary and well-established distinction
between direct and indirect effects.").
!10
Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
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gregate? Raich resolved this by declining to apply Lopez's rule to as-applied
challenges. Instead of applying Lopez's four-part test to the plaintiff's individual actions, or to their limited class of activity, the majority relied on the aggregation doctrine and concluded that the fact that "the [CSA] ensnares some
purely [noncommercial] activity is of no moment.""' Thus, the aggregation
rule, as interpreted by Raich, prevents courts from singling out an individual's
actions and applying the Lopez test. Instead, courts must always consider the
activity in the aggregate.
Before Raich, the overwhelming majority of successful Commerce
Clause challenges came in the form of as-applied challenges that analyzed the
particular actions, or limited class of activity, in a given case under the four-part
Lopez test." 2 A comprehensive study of lower court Commerce Clause cases
conducted by Professors Brannon P. Denning and Glenn H. Reynolds in 2003
found only one post-Morrison case in which a statute was held facially unconstitutional, and that decision was overturned en banc.' 13 Likewise, a similar
study by the two that was published in 2000 shortly before the Supreme Court's
decision in Morrison, found only one post-Lopez case in which an appeals court
had struck down a statute on its face on Commerce Clause grounds and that was
Morrison itself.' 4 By contrast, Denning and Reynolds found nine postMorrison examples of successful as-applied challenges, and there have since
been several other such decisions, including Raich itself.' 5 These courts have
sustained as-applied challenges by applying the four-part Lopez test to the particular conduct at issue or the "class of activity" within which that conduct
falls."16 Raich's interpretation of the aggregation rule would have lead those
courts to hold for the government in each of those cases because it prevents Lopez's test from being used in as-applied challenges. This means, if Raich had
been decided alongside Lopez, even putting aside the broader regulatory scheme7
rule, the only successful challenge post-Lopez would have come in Morrison."

Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209.
Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce
Clause JurisprudenceEncountersthe Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REv. 1253, 1263 (2003).
See id.
13
114
See id. at 1254 ("At the time we wrote our article, in fact, though literally hundreds of cases
II

112

involving a Lopez challenge had been decided between 1995 and 1999, only one appeals court
had found a federal statute invalid on its face.").
See, e.g., United States v. McCoy 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Stewart
15
348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (11 th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303 (1 1th Cir. 2005); but see United States v. Morales-De Jesus, 372
F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2004).
116
See, e.g., Maxwell, 386 F.3d at 1067 (concluding that "Morrison's four considerations reveals no rational basis for concluding that the conduct for which Maxwell was convicted substantially affects or affected interstate commerce").
117
See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text (noting that only one facial challenge had
been successful and a second had succeeded before a panel but was reversed en banc). My re-
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Thus, Raich's holding that as-applied commerce challenges should not be analyzed under the Lopez test will have a dramatic impact on the scope of Congress' commerce power. However, as with the broader scheme rule, the Court's
generalized analysis and failure to adopt or discuss a clear framework for analyzing future cases leaves some important issues unanswered.
Although Raich will prevent litigants from relying on the application of
Lopez to their individual actions in bringing a commerce challenge, it does not
directly address whether there can ever be a successful as-applied commerce
challenge and, if so, what the doctrinal basis for the challenge would be. Indeed, none of the opinions in Raich discuss the subject of as-applied challenges
in any depth. Justice Stevens' opinion might appear to assume that as-applied
Commerce Clause challenges could be appropriate in some circumstances in
that he did not expressly adopt the government's view that the only relevant
activity in commerce analysis was the broad activity defined in the statute by
Congress.' 18 But, given Raich's interpretation of the aggregation doctrine, can
there really ever be a successful as-applied challenge after Raich and, if so, on
what grounds?
If the aggregation rule does permit as-applied Commerce Clause challenges, one thing is certain--they cannot be based on a straightforward application of the Lopez test to the activity or "class of activity" involved in the case. If
such as-applied challenges based on Lopez were allowed, Raich, of course,
would have reached the opposite result. As Justice O'Connor noted in Raich,
"[e]veryone agrees that the marijuana at issue in this case was never in the
stream of commerce, and neither were the supplies for growing it."" 9 Indeed,
it's hard to imagine an activity that is less commercial than growing and possessing a plant for your own medical use. Thus, if there is such a thing as an asapplied Commerce Clause challenge after Raich, the Lopez test will not play the
determinative role in the analysis.
Instead, the only possible basis for an as-applied challenge left open by
Raich would be to argue that the particular activity, or class of activity, at issue
is so unlike the activity regulated by the statute generally that Congress could
not have rationally included it in the generally defined activity. In such a scenario, the as-applied challenge could theoretically go forward because the specific (noncommercial) activity would be so different from the general (commercial) activity defined in the statute that they could not be aggregated. Parts of
Justice Stevens' opinion indicate this option may remain open after Raich. Stevens' brief discussion of the class of activities question, for example, concludes
that "Congress acted rationally in determining that none of the characteristics
making up the [plaintiffs] purported class, whether viewed individually or in
search did not reveal any instances of successful facial commerce challenges that have occurred
after the Denning and Reynolds article was published.
118
See Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.blogspot.comarchives/2005_06_01_Isolumarchive.html#1 11806792342237189 (June 6, 2005, 06:13:00 P.M.).
"9
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2225 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the aggregate, compelled an exemption from the CSA[.]"' 2 ° This statement,
while not a model of clarity for guiding future cases, implies that a case could
arise where a characteristic of the activity, or class of activity, is so distinct that
it would not be rational to define it as part of the economic activity covered by
the statute generally.
On the other hand, other statements in Raich suggest the Court will always defer to Congress' definition in applying the aggregation rule, in which
case as-applied commerce challenges could never succeed under any circumstances. Specifically, Stevens states that "case law firmly establishes Congress'
power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic 'class of
activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce"' 2' and that
"when Congress decides that the 'total incident' of a practice poses a threat to a
national market, it may regulate the entire class."'22 These passages may mean
that all commerce challenges will be viewed as facial challenges after Raich.
Assuming for purposes of this discussion, however, that as-applied commerce
challenges are technically still permitted, it is difficult to think of many scenarios in which a litigant could possibly meet the requirements for success.
To succeed in an as-applied commerce challenge after Raich, a litigant
would have to show, first, that her activity was so distinct as to "compel[] an
exemption"' 123 from the generally defined activity (in other words, that it is not
rational to include the specific activity in the general definition) and, second,
that her activity is itself outside the scope of the commerce power. A 1965
Sixth Circuit case, United States v. Ohio, 2 4 provides an example of the sort of
scenario that may support singling out a particular activity from that covered by
the statute generally for purposes of applying the aggregation rule. The case,
like Wickard, involved a claim under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938.125 The state of Ohio operated state-run wheet farms at its prisons and
mental institutions as a "means of occupational training and [was] ...an integral part of the program for individual therapy and rehabilitation."' 126 The institutions harvested wheat above their Agricultural Act allotment and the United
States filed suit. 127 Ohio's state constitution provided that nothing produced by
prison or mental institution inmates could be "sold, farmed out, contracted, or
given away."' 128 In addition, all of the wheat produced on the State farms was

120
121

Id. at 2211.
Id. at 2205.

124

Id. at 2206 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2211 (emphasis added),
354 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1965).

125

Id.at 551.

126

Id.

127

Id.

128

Id.

122
123
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used and consumed by State institutions. 29 Ohio argued that its program was
outside the scope of the commerce power and the Agricultural Act because its
wheat could not possibly have been "held available for marketing."' 130 The Sixth
Circuit agreed and found that the state-run farms could not be "aggregated" with
other wheat production because "it cannot be said that any of the wheat produced on the state-owned farms was in a 'marketable condition' at any time or
that wheat grown under such circumstances 'overhangs the market. '""131 The
panel thus decided to adopt a narrow construction of the statute to uphold
Ohio's program and avoided ruling on the ultimate Commerce Clause issue.
The Supreme Court, however, summarily reversed the Sixth Circuit in a one
sentence per curium opinion that cited Wickard.132 Although the Supreme
Court's reversal indicates that the aggregation doctrine, and Raich's interpretation of the aggregation doctrine in relation to Lopez, might not permit as-applied
challenges under any circumstances, the facts in the Sixth Circuit opinion are
consistent with the type of program that could arguably be so distinct from the
general activity that it could potentially ground a successful as-applied challenge after Raich.
A hypothetical medical marijuana example similar to the Ohio program
helps demonstrates the argument that one might make in bringing an as-applied
commerce challenge after Raich. In this hypothetical, a state owns and operates
its own medical marijuana clinics. In these clinics, the state grows its own marijuana and provides it to registered patients on site and free of charge. Patients
are strictly prohibited from removing any marijuana from the facilities. The
clinics do not allow patients to bring bags or backpacks into the rooms where
they consume their medicine, and authorities perform pat-down searches of each
patient as he is leaving the clinic. 133 In a commerce challenge, the state-run
clinic could argue that the CSA cannot constitutionally apply to its activities
because its actions cannot rationally be aggregated with typical marijuanarelated activity. A few statements in Raich would support this argument. For
example, Justice Stevens pointed out the possibility of "diversion of homegrown
marijuana' 134 into the interstate market as a justification for his interpretation
and application of the aggregation rule. Similarly, in explaining why the plain129

Id. at 553.

130

Id.

131

Id. at 555.

132

See United States v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 9 (1966).

133 Before Raich, I proposed a similar hypothetical and argued that a state-run medical marijuana system would have a better chance of succeeding in an as-applied Commerce Clause challenge to the CSA than the Raich plaintiffs. See Alex Kreit, The Future of Medical Marijuana:
Should the States Grow Their Own?, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1787, 1816-17, 1824-25 (2003). This
hypothetical is not meant to imply that a program of this sort could provide patients with the services they need as a practical matter. But, it is a good example for purposes of examining how
Raich impacts as-applied commerce challenges.
134 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2207 (2005).
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tiffs class of activity was indistinguishable from the activity covered by the
CSA generally, Justice Stevens argued that the existence of California's law did
not help the plaintiffs because "[t]he notion that California law has surgically
excised a discrete activity that is hermetically sealed off from the larger interstate marijuana market is a dubious proposition, and, more importantly one that
Congress could have rationally rejected. 1 35 The clinic, by contrast, could argue
that its program is indeed sealed off from the market and that there is no possibility marijuana will be diverted into the market. Thus, the clinic would argue,
Congress could not have rationally "conclude[d] that failure to regulate that
would undercut the regulation of the
class of activity [engaged in by the clinic]
36
interstate market in that commodity.'1
Although a program of this sort is the most likely candidate to succeed
in an as-applied commerce challenge after Raich, it would face significant obstacles. The government could rely on passages in Raich that indicate the aggregation rule does not allow any activity to be singled out, such as the statement that "[w]hen Congress decides that the 'total incident' of a practice poses a
threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class."' 37 In addition, even
if there were no danger that the marijuana in the hypothetical would be diverted
into interstate commerce, it could still impact the marijuana market by reducing
demand for marijuana in the regular market on the part of the patients. 38 Finally, Raich also states that "state action cannot circumscribe Congress' plenary
commerce power."' 39 In any event, whether or not Raich leaves open the possibility for an as-applied challenge, its application of the aggregation rule makes
clear that courts will not analyze as-applied challenges under the Lopez test and
that any as-applied challenge would have to be based on distinguishing the individual activity from the activity targeted by the statute. This would be a very
difficult standard to meet and could only be useful, if at all, in very limited circumstances. For example, it is hard to conceive how any individual could rely
on this as-applied challenge theory. If an individual could bring a successful asapplied challenge by demonstrating that her activity was reliably intrastate and
outside of commerce, Raich would have been decided differently. Thus, it
seems that, assuming as-applied challenges are even allowed at all, only an official state program could sufficiently contain an activity within the state to have a
chance of success. Even if as-applied challenges of this sort are permitted in the
135

Id. at 2213.

136

Id. at 2206; see also id. at 2197 ("Given the enforcement difficulties that attend distinguish-

ing between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere, and concerns about
diversion into illicit channels, we have no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis
for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would
leave a gaping hole in the CSA.").
137
Id. at 2206 (emphasis added).
138
See id. at 2207 (arguing that regulation was proper because "leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect price and market conditions").
139
Id. at 2213.
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future, Raich leaves a Commerce Clause jurisprudence in which as-applied challenges are severely disfavored and facial challenges, despite the broader scheme
rule, continue to provide the best opportunity for success. The next section analyzes whether this is consistent with the basic principles of constitutional adjudication and, in particular, the principle that facial challenges should be rare and
as-applied challenges the norm.
V. AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES, THE LOPEZ RULE, AND PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

Lopez and Morrison provoked "a vigorous reexamination of the scope
and purpose of the Commerce Clause," 140 but, amidst the discussion about the
extent of the Court's renewed commerce power limits, courts and commentators
have not considered in depth the fact that Lopez's new test was used in facial
challenges. 14 1 Both Morrison and Lopez overturned regulations in their entirety
based on the four-part test and neither case discussed how the four-part test
might be employed in an as-applied challenge. Although the lack of attention to
the fact that Lopez and Morrison both involved facial challenges is somewhat
understandable in light of the aggregation doctrine's strict treatment of asapplied commerce challenges,142 it is odd when one considers that "as-applied
challenges are the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication"'143 and
"facial challenges are appropriate, if at all, only in exceptional circumstances."' 144
The Supreme Court most famously discussed its preference for asapplied challenges in United States v. Salerno, when it stated that, in order to
bring a successful facial challenge outside of the First Amendment context, "the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid. 1 45 Salerno's strict characterization of the preference for asapplied challenges generated a significant amount of commentary and debate
about both the practical rules governing the use of facial challenges and the
theoretical nature and structure of enforcing constitutional rights. 46 A brief
140

Arthur B. Mark, Currentsin Commerce Clause Scholarship Since Lopez: A Survey, 32 CAP.

U. L. REv. 671,672 (2004).
141 See generally id. (providing a detailed overview of Commerce Clause scholarship none of
which focus on this question).
142
See supra Part II.
143
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third Party Standing, 113
HARv. L. REV. 1321, 1328 (2000).
144
Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth:FacialChallenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 359, 361 (1998).
145 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
146 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN L.
REV. 235 (1994); see also infra notes 147-57 and accompanying text (discussing the debate over
the use of as-applied and facial challenges).
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look at the debate is helpful to understanding the meaning behind the Court's
preference for as-applied challenges and to determining whether Raich's treatment of as-applied challenges is consistent with the principles of constitutional
adjudication.
In one of the most well-known discussions of the structure of constitutional adjudication, Matthew Adler attacked Salerno and argued that there was
"no such thing as a true as-applied constitutional challenge ... [because] [t]he
concept of unconstitutionality does not attach to the treatment of particular litigants."' 147 Adler's theory was based on the proposition that the constitution
"protects the rights-holder from a particular rule (a rule with the wrong predicate or history); it does not protect a particular action of hers from all the rules
under which the action falls.' 48 For example, someone who has been punished
for burning the American flag could successfully bring a First Amendment challenge if she was convicted under a statute that prohibited flag burning but not if
she was convicted under an arson statute. 49 From this, Adler concludes that it
is a "mistaken . . . notion that rule-applications can be properly described as
unconstitutional,"' 150 and that all constitutional challenges are facial challenges
in the sense that "every constitutional challenge involves the facial scrutiny of
rules." 15'
Although Adler's provocative conclusion about as-applied challenges
does not describe the current practice of the Supreme Court, 52 his insights into
the use of rules in constitutional litigation are vitally important to understanding
the difference between as-applied and facial challenges. Richard Fallon, Jr.
focused on the importance of rules in a response to Adler that defended asapplied challenges. Fallon argued that "all challenges to statutes arise when a
particular litigant claims that a statute cannot be enforced against her" and that
"facial challenges and invalidations are best conceptualized as incidents or outgrowths of as-applied litigation."' 153 Importantly, he agreed with Adler that
"many constitutional rights are rights against rules (or ... subrules),"' 4 but ar147

Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional

Law, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1, 157 (1998).
148

Id. at 3.

149

Id.at 3-7; see also David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding

Concrete Context for FormalistAdjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 808, 859-60 (2004) (discussing

this aspect of Adler's argument).
15o
11

Adler, supra note 147, at 157.
Id.

152

Fallon, supra note 143, at 1335 (agreeing with Adler's insight into the use of rules in constitutional adjudication but arguing that his "account [of as-applied challenges] is out of touch with
the ordinary notions of how courts construe statutes").
153
Id. at 1324.
154
Id. Fallon did not agree with this proposition entirely, however. He noted that, while "some
important rights are rights against rules... [a] few rights involve absolute immunities from government coercion[.]" Id. at 1365.
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gued this principle was "entirely compatible with the familiar understanding that
as-applied challenges are the normal mode of constitutional adjudication.' 55
This is because "statutes are often best understood as encompassing a number of
subrules, which frequently are specified only in the process of statutory applica56
tion, and that some subrules may be validly applied even if others may not."
Thus Fallon concluded, "as-applied challenges-as appropriately characterizedremain' 157the normal and logically primary mode of constitutional attack on a stat-

ute[.]

A detailed look at this debate is beyond the scope of this article. The
important point for our purposes is that constitutional litigation is based on constitutional rules. Once a court has found a violation of a constitutional rule, its
decision to invalidate the statute as-applied to the circumstances in a case or in
its entirety is usually merely a function of the substantive constitutional rule at
issue and the rules of severability. As Michael Doff has put it, "a litigant can
prevail on a facial challenge only if she can prevail on an as-applied challenge,
and even then she may lose the facial challenge. 1 58 These principles explain
both why Salerno's statements do not restrict the use of facial challenges as
tightly as they might seem to at first and why as-applied challenges are the preferred method of constitutional adjudication. 59 Although Salerno's "no set of
circumstances" language sounds difficult to satisfy, it is merely "a descriptive
claim about a statute whose terms state an invalid rule of law."' 60 These "valid
rule"'16' facial challenges are a product of substantive constitutional rules and are
uncommon only because the principles of severability generally lead to application-specific results.
Sometimes, however, every possible application of a
statute will be unconstitutional under a particular constitutional rule, in which
case Salerno's "no set of circumstances" rule will be satisfied. Alternatively,
cases can arise where a court is unable to sever a statute's unconstitutional applications from its constitutional applications and, therefore, must strike down,
or alter, the statute in its entirety.

157

Id. at 1329.
Id. at 1334.
Id. at 1368.

158

Dorf, supra note 146, at 239.

159

Id. at 251-83 (noting various areas where the Court has recognized facial challenges and

155
156

discussing the principles of severability).
160
Isserles, supra note 144, at 364.
161
See generally id. (discussing the valid rule facial challenge); Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 3 (same).
162
See Fallon, supra note 143, at 1324 ("[Tlhe availability of facial challenges varies on a
doctrine-by-doctrine basis and is a function of the applicable substantive tests of constitutional
validity."); Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 881
(2005) ("[Wlhat differentiates facial and as-applied challenges is not the breadth of the challenge,
but the nature of the claim being asserted.").
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Although the circumstances that give rise to a successful valid rule facial challenge will depend on the unique factors of each statute and constitutional rule, they often fall into general categories. 63 Purpose-based constitutional rules, for example, are one of the most recognizable forms of valid rule
facial challenges, in large part because they inherently lead courts to consider
the facial validity of a statute.164 Under a purpose test, a court considers only
whether the purpose of the statute is constitutionally defective.1 65 Thus, a challenge based on a purpose rule will never depend on the facts of the case. Either
the statute will be unconstitutional in every one of its applications, or in none of
them.
While rules that focus on a statute's purpose always test the facial validity of a statute, most valid-rule facial challenges are the result of constitutional
rules that can be employed in either as-applied and facial challenges. In these
situations, a court will decide whether to hold a statute unconstitutional on its
face or in a particular application based on the terms of the challenged statute in
relation to the constitutional rule and the remedial rules of severability. A constitutional rule refers to a rule or test the Court employs to give meaning to a
constitutional provision. 166 A recent series of cases adopting and applying a
Sixth Amendment rule protecting the right to a jury trial provides a helpful and
timely example of this sort of constitutional rule. The rule, which was established in Apprendi v. New Jersey, holds that it is unconstitutional to sentence a
defendant to a punishment greater than the maximum sentence authorized by
facts found by a jury or admitted to by a defendant. 67 In Apprendi, a New Jersey statute provided for imprisonment of between five and ten years for the
crime of possession of a firearm with an unlawful purpose. 168 A second statute
extended the term of imprisonment to between ten and twenty years if the trial
judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "'[t]he defendant in
committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group
of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity.' ' 1 69 Because the separate statute required a trial judge to
make a factual finding that would increase a defendant's sentence above the
sentence provided for by the jury, the Court found that "the New Jersey statu-

163

See, e.g., Isserles, supra note 144, at 423-56 (discussing the different types of valid-rule

facial challenges and proposing a method for determining when a valid-rule facial challenge is
appropriate).
164
Id. at 399-400 (discussing purpose based tests in relation to facial challenges).
165
See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992) (considering legislative purpose).
166
See Isserles, supra note 144, at 364.
167
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
168
Id. at 469.
169
Id. at 468-69 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000)).
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tory scheme" could not stand "in light of the
constitutional rule explained
70
above" and struck the statute down on its face.'
The Apprendi rule has also been used to sustain as-applied challenges to
statutes that are unconstitutional in some, but not all, of its applications. For
example, the federal statutory provisions governing minimum and maximum
drug sentences provide for overlapping sentencing ranges based on the drug
type and quantity involved in the offense. A defendant convicted of possession
with intent to distribute an unspecified quantity of a schedule I or H drug 171 can
be sentenced to up to twenty years 72 but various threshold quantities for different drugs can raise the sentencing range, first, to between five and forty years
imprisonment, 73 and next to between ten years and life.' 74 Before Apprendi, the
practice had been for judges to determine the threshold drug quantity as a sentencing factor,7 7 but, based on the new constitutional rule, courts have held that
it is unconstitutional for a judge to sentence a defendant to more than twenty
years (the base-level maximum sentence) unless the drug quantity necessary to
trigger a higher sentencing range is charged in the indictment and proved to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.' 76 In other words, courts have held that the
drug sentencing scheme is unconstitutional as-applied to individuals who have
been sentenced to more than twenty years imprisonment based on a judge's drug
quantity determination because those sentences are greater than the maximum
authorized by the facts found by the jury's verdict alone. 77 Courts have declined to hold the statute unconstitutional on its face,
78 however, because the statute can be constitutionally applied in many cases. 1

170

Id. at 491-92; see also id. at 497 ("The New Jersey procedure in this case is an unacceptable

departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system.");
Ring v. Ariz., 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (striking down Arizona's death penalty statute which provided
a defendant could only be sentenced to death pursuant to factual determinations made by the judge
alone).
171
The Controlled Substances Act regulates drugs according to different "schedules," with
Schedule I being the most tightly restricted.
172
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2000).
'73
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).
174 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A).
175 See, e.g., United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 156 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Although no legislative history speaks to the question, we have previously held, as three of my colleagues reiterate
now, that Congress intended these specific threshold quantities to be sentencing factors rather than
elements of aggravated drug trafficking offenses.").
176

See, e.g., id.

177

Id. at 156-57 ("Apprendi dictates that in order to authorize the imposition of a sentence

exceeding the maximum allowable without a jury finding, of a specific threshold drug quantity the
specific threshold quantity must be treated as an element of an aggravated drug trafficking offense, i.e., charged in the indictment and proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.").
178 See, e.g., United States v. McAllister, 272 F.3d 228, 232-33 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that §
841 is not facially unconstitutional).
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Finally, United States v. Booker 79 is an example of a case in which the
rules of severability led the Court to invalidate statutory provisions that have
some constitutional applications in their entirety. 18° In Booker, the Court applied the Apprendi rule to the federal Sentencing Guidelines.' 8 ' Under the
Guidelines, the jury's conviction set an initial sentencing range based on the
offense, then judges were required to make factual determinations in applying a
wide array of "sentencing factors," such as whether the defendant brandished a
firearm during the commission of the offense' 82 or whether the defendant had
committed obstruction of justice. 83 These judicial findings adjusted the sentencing range and could result in a sentence that was higher than the range authorized by the jury's verdict alone. In a splintered opinion, five Justices held
that the mandatory guidelines were unconstitutional as-applied to sentences that
were above the range authorized by the facts established by a plea or the jury
verdict. 84 Sentences that did not involve enhancements, which accounted for
45% of federal sentences, 85 and sentences that involved an enhancement but
resulted in a sentence within the range authorized by the jury, 186 however, were
constitutional. 187 Thus, "the Guidelines could be constitutionally applied in
their entirety, without any modifications,
in the 'majority of the cases sentenced
188
under the federal guidelines."",
A different five Justice majority provided the Court's remedial opinion
to the constitutional error. 89 They found that the rules of severability, in particular the need to consider "Congress' basic objectives in enacting the statute, 90 warranted invalidating the provisions that made the Guidelines mandatory in their entirety in order to create a scheme of "advisory" sentencing guide-

179
180

543 U.S. 220 (2005).
I do not take a position on the merits of the Booker remedy, but note it only as an example

of how the Court has applied the rules of severability in relation to a substantive constitutional
rule.

181
182

Booker, 543 U.S. at 238.
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C).

183

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.L.

184

Booker, 543 U.S. at 244.
Id. at 275 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 278. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Because the guidelines' ranges overlap, a Judge

185

186

could make findings of fact that increased the applicable range, and still impose a sentence within
the sentencing range based on the facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.
187

Id. at 244, 278.

188

Id. at 276 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 244-67. Only Justice Ginsburg joined both the merits and remedial majorities. The

189

four other Justices that provided the Court's remedy dissented on the merits and argued that the
Guidelines were not constitutionally deficient.
190

Id. at 259.
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lines.' 9' Accordingly, despite the fact that the mandatory guidelines could be
constitutionally applied in a number of cases, the remedial majority facially
invalidated a handful of its provisions based on the rules of severability.
These Sixth Amendment cases demonstrate how a constitutional rule
that prevents the government from engaging in a particular action-such as subjecting a defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's
verdict alone-can serve as the basis for both as-applied and facial challenges.
A court's decision to strike down a statute on its face or only in certain applications depends upon whether that statute violates the relevant constitutional rule
in all of its applications or whether the rules of severability warrant facial invalidation of a statute that is unconstitutional in some but not all of its applications. 92 In addition to these valid rule facial challenges, the Court also recognizes a significantly more limited type of facial challenge: the overbreadth challenge. In an overbreadth challenge, a litigant argues that a statute that can constitutionally be applied to him should "not be enforced against him, because it
[cannot constitutionally] be enforced against someone else."' 193 Unlike validrule challenges, where facial invalidity exists because a statute would be unconstitutional in each application or because the rules of severability require it, an
overbeadth challenge predicates "facial invalidity.., on the existence of some
number of potentially unconstitutional applications of an otherwise valid statutory rule." 194 In United States v. Sabri, the Supreme Court explained that
"[flacial challenges of this sort are especially to be discouraged" because they
"invite judgments on fact-poor records" and "call for relaxing familiar requirements of standing .... Accordingly, we have recognized the validity of facial
191 Although the remedial dissenters vigorously objected to the majority's approach, Justice

Stevens, in dissent, accepted that severability could sometimes lead to facial invalidation of provisions that had constitutional applications. See Metzger, supra note 162, at 892 ("As Justice Stevens acknowledged, the unconstitutionality of some parts of a statute may force its invalidation as
a whole if those provisions are not severable; the reason for this is of course the valid rule requirement.").
192
See Fallon, supra note 143, at 1324 ("[T]he availability of facial challenges varies on a
doctrine-by-doctrine basis and is a function of the applicable substantive tests of constitutional
validity.").
193
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004).
194
Isserles, supra note 144, at 370. Some have argued that overbreadth challenges are really
valid rule challenges. For example, Monaghan has claimed that the First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine is just a way of characterizing the rule that statutes abridging First Amendment interests
must employ the least restrictive means to achieve the government's goals. Monaghan, supra note
161, at 24-25, 37-39; but see Isserles, supra note 144, at 411 (arguing that in "[a]n overbreadth
facial challenge ... the Court resolves such a challenge by analyzing the constitutionality of statutory applications against third parties not before the Court" whereas a valid-rule facial challenge
addresses "validity of the statutory rule itself when measured against the relevant constitutional
doctrine"). Whatever the merits of this claim are, for purposes of this article it is sufficient to note
that the Supreme Court continues to distinguish valid-rule facial challenges from overbreadth
challenges. See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 609 (contrasting overbreadth challenges with valid rule challenges which "in the strictest sense of saying that no application of the statute could be constitutional").
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attacks alleging overbreadth (though not necessarily using that term) in relatively few settings, and, generally, on the strength of specific reasons weighty
enough to overcome our well-founded reticence."' 95 These settings include, free
speech, the right to travel, abortion, and legislation under §5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 196
In summary, while debate continues over the precise contours of facial
and as-applied challenges, there are basic principles of constitutional adjudication that are well established in the case law. First, as-applied challenges are the
preferred means for challenging the constitutionality of a statute and facial challenges are comparatively rare. 197 Second, there are three broad categories of
facial challenges: valid rule challenges, overbreadth challenges, and facial invalidations based on the rules of severability. Valid rule challenges occur when
a statute is unconstitutional in all of its applications under the relevant constitutional rule or when a statute's unconstitutional and constitutional applications
cannot be severed from one another. 98 Overbreadth challenges have been recognized in only a handful of areas of constitutional law and allow a litigant to
challenge a statute based on its potential unconstitutional applications to third
parties, even though the statute can be constitutionally applied to him. 199 Finally, a court may hold a statute that has constitutional applications unconstitutional on its face if the rules of severability prevent the constitutional applications from being separated from the unconstitutional applications. 200
A central problem in Raich is that its interpretation of the aggregation
doctrine leaves a Commerce Clause jurisprudence that is inconsistent with these
basic principles of constitutional adjudication. Most facial challenges are "outgrowths of as-applied adjudication" 20 1 in that, due to the relevant constitutional
and severability rules, "some assessments of 'as-applied' challenges necessarily
yield the conclusion that a statute is wholly invalid[.]

' 20 2

The exception is an

overbreadth challenge, which is based on the claim that a statute that can be
constitutionally applied to the litigant bringing the challenge is unconstitutional
as-applied to third parties.2 °3 In other words, all facial challenges are based on
some number of unconstitutional applicationsof a statute in relation to the rele195
196

Sabri, 541 U.S. at 609-10.
Id. at 609.

197 See Fallon, supra note 143, at 1368 (noting that "as-applied challenges-as appropriately
characterized-remain the normal and logically primary mode of constitutional attack on a statute").
198 See generally Isserles, supra note 144 (discussing the valid rule facial challenge).
199 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 609-10.
200 See Fallon, supra note 143, at 1324 (noting that "facial challenges and invalidations are best
conceptualized as incidents or outgrowths of as-applied litigation").
201
Fallon, supra note 143, at 1341.
202
Id. at 1338.
203
Sabri, 541 U.S. at 609-10.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2006

33

West Virginia
Law Review,
Vol.LAW
108,REVIEW
Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 9
WEST
VIRGINIA

[Vol. 108

vant constitutional rule. Apart from overbreadth challenges, if a statute has any
constitutional applications, a court will employ rules of severability to save
those applications to the extent possible, which is why facial challenges are considered rare and as-applied challenges the norm. 20 4 Thus, at the most basic
level, if an application of a statute is inconsistent with a constitutional rule, a
Court either will hold the statute unconstitutional as-applied to that circumstance or, in some situations, it will strike down the statute in its entirety. The
idea that a Court would uphold an application of a statute that violates a constitutional rule, however, is antithetical to these general principles of constitutional
adjudication. Likewise, an area of constitutional law where facial challenges are
preferred and as-applied challenges allowed only rarely, if ever, would be very
unusual. This is severely problematic for Raich because, if the Court had applied the constitutional rule announced in Lopez to the individual plaintiffs actions, it would have found the CSA unconstitutional as-applied to them. As
Justice O'Connor noted in dissent, "[e]veryone agrees that the marijuana at issue in this case was never in the stream of commerce, and neither were the supplies for growing it. ' ' 20 5 Indeed, even the government did not argue that the indi-

vidual plaintiffs actions were commercial or had a non-attenuated relationship
with commerce. 2°
As discussed above, Raich did not apply or even mention the four-part
Lopez test. Instead, in essence, it upheld application of the CSA to the plaintiffs
in Raich because the CSA could be constitutionally applied to others. Its view
was that "because some of the CSA's applications are constitutional, they must
all be constitutional[.]" 20 7 This approach turns the principles of constitutional
adjudication on their head. It is the exact opposite of the way overbreadth or
valid-rule severability function. Imagine, for example, if in Booker, the Court
had held that the Sentencing Guidelines' unconstitutional applications were acceptable because the majority of the Guidelines applications were constitutional;
if the Court had concluded that the fact "that the regulation ensnares some [sen20 8
tences greater than what the jury's verdict has authorized] is of no moment.,
It sounds absurd in the context of the Sixth Amendment, but that is what the
Raich majority did by declining to apply the constitutional rule announced in
Lopez and extending the aggregation doctrine to noncommercial activity. 2°9 The
result is a Commerce Clause jurisprudence in which as-applied challenges are
rarely, if ever, allowed, and facial challenges are preferred.
204

See Fallon, supra note 143, at 1334.

205

Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2225 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

206

See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 48, at 21.

207

Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2238 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 2209 ("That the regula-

tion ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of [the CSA's] larger scheme.").
208
See id. at 2209.

209

Id. at 2206 ("When Congress decides that the 'total incidence' of a practice poses a threat to

a national market, it may regulate the entire class.").
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Although the Raich majority did not justify or discuss its approach in
relation to the rules of constitutional adjudication, there are a number of potential arguments one might make in its defense. First, one might argue that the
Raich majority's approach to as-applied challenges is not problematic because it
is consistent with Wickard. Indeed, the reason the Raich majority's approach to
as-applied challenges did not seem as unusual as it would have in the context of
a different constitutional rule is that it was based on what seemed like a straightforward application of the aggregation doctrine. 210 As discussed above, the
scope of the commerce power was so expansive after Wickard in large part because the aggregation doctrine eliminated even as-applied Commerce Clause
challenges. 2 1 Before Wickard, the Court considered the intrastate, local character of an activity to limit congressional commerce authority 21 2 and Wickard held
that even the most local, intrastate activity could be regulated so long as the
activity, in the aggregate, had an affect of commerce.213 The Raich majority's
reasoning was based on this theory and on language from a number of Commerce Clause cases that supported a broad reading of the aggregation doctrine. 21 4 Wickard, however, does not justify Raich's treatment of as-applied
challenges because Lopez created an entirely new constitutional rule. Before
Lopez, the absence of an as-applied commerce challenge was not problematic in
terms of the principles of constitutional adjudication, precisely because there
was no constitutional rule limiting Congress' commerce power. Before Lopez,
the commerce power was thought to be limitless.215 Lopez and Morrison, of
course, created a new Commerce Clause test. If the Raich Court found a conflict between the new rule and Wickard, it should either have overruled Lopez or
interpreted the aggregation doctrine to permit as-applied challenges based on the
Lopez test. Either result would have been consistent with the principles of constitutional adjudication, but Raich's decision to treat Lopez as good law and, at
the same time, decline to apply the Lopez test to the plaintiffs was not.
Second, one might make a related argument that Raich's failure to apply
the constitutional rule in Lopez to the plaintiffs is justified because recognizing
an as-applied Lopez challenge would too narrowly limit Congress' commerce

210

See supra Part IV.B.

211

See supra Part III.

See A.L.A. Schechter Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935) ("In determining how far the
federal government may go in controlling intrastate transactions upon the ground that they 'affect'
interstate commerce, there is a necessary and well-established distinction between direct and
indirect effects.").
212

213

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (quoting Md. v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183, 193 (1968) ("Where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of
federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise as trivial, individual instances' of the class.").
215
See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
214

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2006

35

West VirginiaWEST
Law Review,
Vol.LAW
108,REVIEW
Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 9
VIRGINIA

[Vol. 108

power.21 6 After all, even Justice O'Connor's Raich dissent did not embrace
applying the rule in Lopez to an individual's activity: "I agree with the Court
that we must look beyond respondents' own activities. Otherwise, individual
litigants could always exempt themselves from Commerce Clause regulation
merely by pointing to the obvious-that their personal activities do not have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. ' ,21 7 Instead, O'Connor argued that
courts should engage in a case-by-case analysis to define the relevant "class of
activity" for purposes of applying Lopez. z1 8 Despite support from O'Connor's
opinion, this argument suffers from two shortcomings. First, it does not address
the inconsistencies between Raich's approach to as-applied challenges and the
basic principles of constitutional adjudication. Even if there are persuasive policy reasons, or Commerce Clause cases, that support limiting the rule in Lopez
to facial challenges, they are unrelated to the question of whether that limitation
is consistent with the preference for as-applied challenges. In Booker, for example, the government could have argued that policy considerations and pre-Apprendi cases weighed in favor of ignoring the Apprendi rule in applying the
Sentencing Guidelines, but those considerations would not have provided a justification as a matter of constitutional adjudication. In short, unless a substantive rule is of a type that can only be employed in a facial challenge-such as a
purpose-based test-it should be used in both as-applied and facial challenges,
or not at all.
In any event, the fear that applying the rule in Lopez to an individual's
actions would severely restrict the commerce power is unwarranted. It is true
that any litigant could argue his own activity is local or does not substantially
affect interstate commerce. But these arguments wouldn't sustain an as-applied
challenge under Lopez, because Lopez limits the commerce power based on
whether an activity is commercial or has an attenuated relationship to interstate
commerce and not on whether it is intrastate or local. The most straightforward
resolution of Lopez and Wickard, it seems, is a framework in which the aggregation doctrine would permit Congress to regulate even the most "local" activity
but Lopez would constrain that rule by forbidding the regulation of noncommercial activity with an attenuated impact on commerce. It is important to note that
the question of whether an activity has an attenuated relationship with commerce is distinct from whether it has a significant impact on commerce. Surely,
216

See Nathaniel Stewart, Note, Turning the Commerce Clause Challenge "On its Face": Why

Federal Commerce Clause Statutes Demand Facial Challenges 55 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 161, 164

(2004) (analyzing past cases and arguing that "the structure and text of the Constitution's grant of
Commerce Clause authority proscribes as-applied challenges to commerce-based statutes" and
permits only facial challenges).
217 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2223 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
218 See id. ("The task is to identify a mode of analysis that allows Congress to regulate more
than nothing (by declining to reduce each case to its litigants) and less than everything (by declining to let Congress set the terms of analysis). The analysis may not be the same in every case, for
it depends on the regulatory scheme at issue and the federalism concerns implicated.").
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almost any activity taken in isolation has only a minor impact on interstate
commerce, but the vast majority have a nonattenuated relationship with commerce. Thus, this interpretation would allow as-applied challenges based on
Lopez and maintain the essential holding in Wickard.219 In addition, it would
not significantly limit Congress' commerce power because most individual activity has a commercial character.22 °
Third, the Court's approach could be justified by arguing that challenges based on Congress' enumerated powers must take the statute head-on
because enumerated powers are concerned with Congress' power to enact a particular statute and not with individual rights. On this view, enumerated powers,
such as the Commerce Clause, "state[] a condition for the validity of legislation,
rather than stating a test for the validity of the application of Congress's will to
particular sets of circumstances.,, 221 This position might have been persuasive a
few years ago, but it is now undermined by the fact that the Court has recog222
nized as-applied challenges in the context of enumerated powers. Indeed, one
of the Court's most recent statements on the preference for as-applied challenges to facial challenges came in the Spending Clause case United States v.
Sabri.223 In addition, as Gillian E. Metzger's insightful examination of the use
of facial and as-applied challenges in Section 5 jurisprudence discusses, the
Court has also recognized as-applied challenges based on Section 5 power limitations. 224 Moreover, when the Court has employed facial challenges in the
context of Section 5, it has done so on an overbreadth theory.2 25 Thus, applications of a statute that are unconstitutional under the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence are remedied either through facial or as-applied challenges. As already
discussed, Raich takes precisely the opposite approach by, in essence, holding
that a statute's unconstitutional applications can be saved by constitutional applications.22 6 Finally, before Wickard, the Court recognized both as-applied and

219

See infra Part VI (discussing the enterprise theory for analyzing commerce challenges and

arguing that it would help to reconcile Wickard and Lopez).
220 See id. (discussing how many individual actions can be viewed as "commercial" under the
enterprise theory).
221 Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial
Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1154 (2003). See also id. at 1151 (arguing that enumerated powers
provisions function as "existence conditions" which require facial challenges and not as "application conditions").
222

Both United States v. Sabri, 541 U.S. 600 (2004), and Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509

(2004), were decided after the publication of Professors Adler and Dorf's article arguing that
enumerated powers are examples of existence conditions.
223

541 U.S. at 608-10.

See Metzger, supra note 162, at 877 (arguing that "Section 5 and other congressional power
challenges should be subject to the ordinary presumption of severability"); see also Tenn. v. Lane,
541 U.S. 509 (2004).
225 See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 610 (listing Section 5 as an area of overbreadth challenges).
226 See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2215 (2005).
224
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facial challenges in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence.2 27 In short, case law
demonstrates that the Court's approach to as-applied and facial challenges in the
area of congressional power follows the normal rules of constitutional adjudication.228 The argument that courts should only use facial challenges in the context of the Commerce Clause because enumerated powers condition the validity
of statutes and do not grant individual rights does not conform to the established
practice of the Supreme Court in enumerated powers cases.
Finally, one might argue that the rule in Lopez does not extend to asapplied challenges because the nature of the Lopez test requires courts to consider a statute in its entirety when applying the test. Under this theory, the
Commerce Clause test would be similar to a purpose-based test, in which the
inquiry always focuses on the statute as a whole. To support this argument one
might point out that two of the four Morrison factors-whether the statute contained an express jurisdictional element to limit its reach and whether the statute's legislative history contained congressional findings on the impact of the
regulated activity on interstate commerce-appear related only to the statute as
a whole. The jurisdictional hook factor, however, exists to ensure that use of the
commerce power is constitutional as-applied to the individual on a case-by-case
basis. As the Lopez Court explained, "[Section] 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through a case-by-case inquiry, that the
firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce., 229 If a statute contains a sufficient jurisdictional hook, both an as-applied and facial challenge
would fail because the terms of the statute would guarantee that each application
reached only conduct that was within Congressional commerce power. So, although the Court's characterization of the jurisdictional hook factor in Lopez
and Morrison implies it is concerned with a statute on its face, an as-applied
inquiry could as-easily account for this concern by asking whether the activity at
issue had "an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce. 23 °
Because the jurisdictional hook factor discussed in Lopez exists only to ensure a
connection to interstate commerce on a case-by-case basis, the jurisdictional

227

See Metzger, supra note 162, at 906 ("Some facial invalidations occurred, but in other deci-

sions the Court simply held particular statutory applications in excess of the commerce power.
This variation seems best explained, however, as resulting from differences in statutory text, with
facial challenges being largely the norm."). See also A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 542-48 (1935) (holding application of a statute unconstitutional as-applied to
the facts of the case because "[s]o far as the poultry here in question is concerned, the flow of
interstate commerce had ceased"); United States v. E.C. Knight Co. 156 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1895)
(holding the Sherman Act unconstitutional as-applied to the acquisition of monopoly on manufacture of refined sugar).
228 See generally Metzger, supra note 162.
229
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (emphasis added).
230

Id. at 562.
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hook factor does not support the conclusion that the Lopez test must analyze a
statute on its face.23'
Although the legislative history analysis undeniably asks courts to look
to the actions of Congress, the inquiry is not necessarily limited to considering
the legislative history generally. In an as-applied challenge, a court could certainly apply the legislative history factor to determine whether Congress made
findings relevant to regulating activity similar to the activity engaged at issue in
the case. 232 But, even if the inquiry into legislative history were necessarily
limited only to the terms of the statute, this fact would hardly be sufficient to
justify declining to follow the Lopez rule in as-applied challenges. Indeed, legislative history is one of the factors used in the Court's Section 5 "congruence
and proportionality" test, and the Court has employed that test in as-applied
challenges.233 More importantly, the two most important factors in the Lopez
test-the economic nature of the activity and the nature of its relationship to
interstate commerce-naturally lend themselves to use in an as-applied inquiry.
These factors are focused directly on conduct as opposed to, for example, congressional purpose
or whether the terms of a statute are narrowly tailored.
This is similar to Appendi's rule that the imposition of a sentence higher than
what was authorized based on the facts found by the jury or admitted to in a plea
agreement alone is unconstitutional. The Apprendi rule targets a forbidden type
of sentence and the court will overturn a sentence of this type as unconstitutional whatever the terms of the statute.235 Thus, the Court has used the rule in
231

Cf. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-49 (1971) (employing the doctrine of constitu-

tional avoidance and interpreting a firearm possession statute to require an additional nexus to
interstate commerce and overturning a conviction where that nexus had not been shown).
232
See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2228 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the legislative history analysis should focus on the activity at issue in the case and criticizing
the CSA because its "declarations are not even specific to marijuana").
233 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530 (2004) (employing the Section 5 test in an as-applied
challenge and noting that "nothing in our case law requires us to consider Title II, with its wide
variety of applications, as an undifferentiated whole"). See also Metzger, supra note 162, at 91329 (analyzing the use of severability rules in Section 5 challenges and concluding that "having to
determine the constitutionality of Section 5 legislation on an as-applied basis [is] a direct function
of the substantive standard the Court has imposed in this context"). This use of as-applied challenges in the context of Section 5 is particularly noteworthy because the other factor in the analysis, whether "Congress' chosen remedy for the pattern of exclusion and discrimination . . . is
congruent and proportional to its object[ive]" is more closely tied to the terms of the federal statute than the other factors in the Lopez test. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531.
234
Indeed, although the broader scheme rule seems to rely in part of the purpose of the scheme,
purpose has not traditionally been used in commerce analysis and is not a factor in the Lopez test.
"[I]n the Commerce Clause context, the Court has long ruled that Congress' actual purpose is
irrelevant where Congress is clearly regulating interstate commerce." Metzger, supra note 162, at
919.
235
The terms of the statute, of course, are relevant to the question of whether the statute is
invalid in all of its applications or to a severability analysis if there are both constitutional and
unconstitutional applications. The important point for our purposes is that the test makes certain
sentences unconstitutional rather than certain modes of regulation.
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236

Likewise, the rule in Lopez targets a
both as-applied and facial challenges.
particular type of conduct that Congress may not regulate: conduct that is noncommercial and has only an attenuated relationship with commerce. A Court
can apply these factors to the facts of a case just as easily as it can to the activity
regulated by a statute in its entirety. Determining whether an activity is commercial or noncommercial depends on features of the activity and not on features of the statute. Thus, the terms of the Lopez test do not support the argument that the Lopez rule applies exclusively to facial challenges. Indeed, they
show that the facial challenges in Lopez and Morrison were valid-rule facial
challenges. Both statutes, by their own terms, regulated noncommercial activity
that had an attenuated impact on commerce and did not include jurisdictional
hooks, thus, under the rule of Lopez, the activities regulated by the terms of the
statutes failed the Lopez test.
VI. THE ENTERPRISE DOCTRINE
The preceding discussion reveals a few significant problems with the
Court's decision in Raich. The Court's use of both the aggregation and broader
scheme rules significantly undermine the rule in Lopez, without directly overruling Lopez and Morrison. The aggregation rule forbids as-applied challenges
based on Lopez, the only challenges that have had any degree of success in
lower courts, in conflict with the norms of constitutional adjudication. The
broader scheme rule, meanwhile, permits Congress to regulate even activity that
would fail the Lopez test in a facial challenge, if the regulations are part of a
larger regulatory scheme in which eliminating the suspect provision would undercut the purpose of the scheme. 37 Some observers surely would not view a
limitless commerce power as problematic-a debate beyond the scope of this
Article-but the problem is more fundamental than the reach of the commerce
power after Raich as such. Whatever one believes about the proper scope of the
commerce power, Raich's limitations of Lopez are problematic because they
create an increasingly confused and convoluted Commerce Clause jurisprudence, where decisions begin to seem like little more than a series of results
rather than a coherent jurisprudence.2 38
After Raich, there are three overlapping Commerce Clause rules: the
aggregation doctrine, the Lopez test, and the broader scheme rule. These rules
236

237
238

See supra notes 171-206 and accompanying text (discussing cases applying Apprendi).
See supra Part IV.A (discussing the broader scheme rule).
See, e.g., Posting of Mark Tushnet to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.coml movable-

type/archives/2005/06/understanding-g.html#trackbacks (June 6, 2005, 02:05 P.M.) ("I suppose
that someone truly dedicated to making doctrinal sense of the cases -- or someone who had to do
so as a matter of professional obligation -- could come up with something that worked. But a
more parsimonious account, I suspect, would be that there are some statutes five or more justices.
. think are more or less good ideas, and others that five or more justices think are more or less
bad ideas; and that those justices will go to any (purportedly doctrinal) port in a storm to reach the
results they think sensible.").
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interact to circumscribe how Congress regulates activity, but no longer seem to
limit what Congress can regulate in any significant way. If the Court wishes to
restore the limitless commerce power Congress enjoyed prior to Lopez, it should
overturn Lopez, rather than adopt new rules that conflict with the old rules and
that are bound to create even more confusion in an already uncertain area. Otherwise, the Court should apply the Lopez rule consistently to ensure that the
substantive and procedural limits on the commerce power are as clear and coherent as possible. 239 A related problem that stems from Raich's treatment of
Lopez and that is cause for concern whether one believes in an expansive or
limited commerce power, is that the treatment of as-applied challenges in the
Commerce Clause is now unlike any other area of constitutional law. As long
as Lopez's test remains good law, it should be employed in both as-applied and
facial challenges consistent with the basic principles of constitutional adjudication.
As already implied, the Court could reconcile the major problems created by Raich by simply abandoning the Lopez rule altogether. Given that none
of the opinions in Raich proposed overturning Lopez, however, that outcome
seems unlikely. This Section briefly proposes an enterprise theory that would
reconcile the Lopez and Wickard rules and provide for as-applied commerce
challenges based on Lopez. This theory would provide substantive limits on the
commerce power consistent with Lopez, while still giving Congress broad regulatory authority over most activity under Wickard. Although the rule is not consistent with Raich, I argue that it provides the best account of pre-Raich commerce cases and is superior to both the approach taken by the Raich majority
and the approach advocated by Justice O'Connor in dissent.
Before outlining the enterprise theory, it is helpful to briefly return to
Justice O'Connor's reluctance to extend the Lopez test to as-applied challenges.
As discussed above, Justice O'Connor did not support applying the Lopez test to
the facts of the case because, she argued, doing so would allow "individual litigants [to] exempt themselves from Commerce Clause regulation merely by
pointing to the obvious-that their personal activities do not have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.' ' 4° Instead, O'Connor argued that the Court
should engage in a case-by-case analysis to identify the "relevant conduct" for
purposes of analyzing the constitutional claim. 241 Applying this approach to
Raich, O'Connor relied on a "number of objective markers," including the California medical marijuana law, to conclude that, in order to "ascertain whether
Congress' encroachment is constitutionally justified in this case . . . I would
239

Cf. Posting

of

Hillel

Levin

to

Prawfs

Blawg,

http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/

prawfsblawg/2005/06/thoughtonraic.html (June 7, 2005, 02:10 P.M.) (posing the question of
whether one of the Lopez and Morrison dissenters should have voted in Raich's favor because the
Court should "not provide Congress with inconsistent rules governing the limits of its power").
240
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2223 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
241
Id. at 2224; see also id. at 2223 ("The analysis may not be the same in every case, for it
depends on the regulatory scheme at issue and the federalism concerns implicated.").
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focus here on the personal cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes. 242 A central problem with Justice O'Connor's approach is
that it does not offer an objective method for defining a "class of activity"
across different cases. Under O'Connor's approach, which is similar to the approach advocated by the Raich plaintiffs and adopted by the Ninth Circuit majority, courts would be left to define the relevant "class of activity" on a case by
case basis, without clear guidelines. And, as with the majority's approach, this
framework would raise questions in relation to the principles of constitutional
adjudication because it would not allow for a true as-applied commerce challenge.
A more fundamental problem with "class of activity" proposal, however, is that it is premised on a common misunderstanding of the relationship
between Wickard and Lopez. Justice O'Connor adopts the "class of activity"
theory to prevent individuals from arguing that their individual actions are outside Congress' reach because they have only a minor impact on commerce. 243
But, this view confuses an as-applied Lopez test with elimination of the aggregation rule. The "local" nature of the activity and the extent of its impact are not
relevant considerations under the Lopez test. So long as the aggregation rule
remains good law, it would prevent a litigant from successfully challenging the
application of a federal statute based on the fact that his activity is local or itself
only has an insignificant impact on commerce. An as-applied Lopez challenge
would only permit a litigant to claim that his actions could not be regulated because they are noneconomic and have only an attenuated relationship with
commerce. The enterprise theory, similar to one that I have previously advanced elsewhere, 244 would help courts apply this rule in a manner consistent
with Wickard and other pre-Lopez cases.
The central idea of the enterprise theory is that it allows the federal government to regulate every aspect of an economic "enterprise" or endeavor, because every aspect of the enterprise is economic and has a non-attenuated relationship with commerce. The theory would ensure that litigants engaged in an
economic endeavor could not avoid federal regulation for various "noncommercial" actions related to the endeavor based on an as-applied Lopez challenge.
The 1968 Supreme Court case Maryland v. Wirtz24 5 provides a helpful discussion of the reasoning behind this enterprise concept. Wirtz considered the constitutionality of a federal law that extended the Fair Labor Standards Act to
cover new categories of employees that had not previously been covered under
the Act.246 While the Act enlarged the number of covered employees, it did "not
242

Id. at 2224.

243

See id. at 2223.

244

See Kreit, supra note 88 (proposing an earlier version of the enterprise theory that con-

cerned facial challenges but did not directly address as-applied challenges).
245 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled on other grounds by Nat'l League of Cities v. Usury, 426
U.S. 833 (1976).
246
Id. at 185-86.
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the class of employers subject to the Act., 247 The extension brought
employees who were not themselves involved in interstate commerce under the
Act.248 In explaining why this fact did not endanger the Act, the Court relied on
the "enterprise concept., 249 The concept is based on the "premise that an 'enterprise' is a set of operations whose activities in commerce would all be250expected to be affected by the wages and hours of any group of employees[.]r
Although Wirtz pre-dates Lopez and, thus, did not discuss the enterprise
theory in relation to the Lopez test, the enterprise concept can help reconcile
Lopez and Wickard in a logical manner that would not dramatically alter Congress' commerce power but would also provide a clear substantive limit and
allow as-applied challenges. The concept recognizes that every aspect of an
economic enterprise or endeavor is commercial in nature, even if the specific
activity targeted by a given regulation could be seen as noncommercial. The
theory is similar to the reasoning adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit in
Rancho Viejo v. Norton.25' In Rancho Viejo, a company planned to construct a
202-acre housing development in California but the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service determined that the development would likely put the existence
of the arroyo southwestern toad, which is listed as an endangered species, at
risk.25 2 In applying the Lopez four-part test, the Court determined that the economic prong was satisfied because the development itself constituted an economic enterprise.253 Likewise, the Court rejected the development's argument
that destruction of the toad had only an attenuated link to commerce because the
development itself had a non-attenuated link to commerce.25 4 As Judge Ginsburg noted in concurrence, this approach would allow Congress to regulate
takes of the arroyo toad if the takes themselves met the four-part Lopez test.2 55
It would not, however, permit federal regulation of "the lone hiker in the
woods" because "though he takes the toad, [he] does not affect interstate commerce." 256 Thus, a litigant could bring as-applied challenges under the Lopez
test, but could only succeed if her noncommercial actions were also unrelated to
an economic enterprise.
...enlarge

249

Id. at 188.
Id. at 186-87.
Id. at 196 n.27.

250

Id. at 197, n.27; see also id. at 192 (noting that "there is a basis in logic and experience for

247
248

the conclusion that substandard labor conditions among any group of employees, whether or not
they are personally engaged in commerce or production, may lead to strife disrupting an entire
enterprise.").
251 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
252
Id. at 1064.
253
Id. at 1068.
254
Id. at 1069.
255
Id. at 1080 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
256

Id.
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The enterprise theory also has the virtue of being entirely consistent
with the result in Wickard. The Wickard Court focused on the wheat Filburn
grew for his own personal use, but Filbum was subject to the Agricultural Adjustment Act's limitations only because he operated a commercial farm.257 The
Agricultural Adjustment Act exempted small producers who grew less than 200
bushels of wheat a year.258 While it is true, as Justice Stevens noted in Raich,
that the fact that Filburn was a commercial farmer was not determinative in
Wickard and the Wickard Court did not treat Filburn's personal wheat cultivation "as part of his commercial farming operation,' 259 the enterprise theory of
Lopez would leave both the central rule of Wickard and its result in tact. It
would only call into question the Wickard Court's treatment of Filburn's personal wheat cultivation separately by justifying the regulation of that activity
based on the theory that Filbum's actions could be aggregated because he was
engaged in farming as an economic enterprise.
VII. CONCLUSION

Raich leaves Commerce Clause jurisprudence in an increasingly confused state and that should be a cause for concern for everyone interested in the
Commerce Clause, regardless of whether one favors a limitless or heavily circumscribed commerce power, or something in between. The Commerce Clause
now encompasses three overlapping rules: the aggregation doctrine, the fourpart Lopez test, and the broader regulatory scheme rule. If Raich is applied
faithfully, the Lopez test will apply in only a very limited number of cases in the
future. But, in the absence of a clear framework for choosing between each
constitutional rule, it is difficult to know exactly how each test will function and
what, if any, activity Congress can not regulate. The confusion that surrounds
the tests, also leaves room for future majorities to follow any of the three rules
or rationales based solely, or primarily, on a Justice's policy preferences or the
ability to cobble together a majority in a particular case. In addition to its internal conflicts, the Commerce Clause now appears to be at odds with the wellsettled principles of constitutional adjudication that favor as-applied to facial
challenges. Given these problems, the Court should either adopt a clearer, universal standard for limiting Congress' commerce power or consider abandoning
its revived limits altogether. Whatever one believes is the ideal interpretation of
the Commerce Clause, 260 a clear framework for analyzing cases that is consis257
258

See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1942).
Id. at 130, n.30; see also Brief for Respondents, supra note 43, at 14 (discussing the exemp-

tions to the Agricultural Adjustment Act).
259
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2207 (2005).
260
Compare, e.g., Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause:
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control
Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1999), with Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of
the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 101 (2001).
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tent with the basic principles of constitutional adjudication (whether it be a return to Wickard in which no challenge can succeed or a revival of Lopez) is
preferable to a jurisprudence in which it seems as if the most "parsimonious
account [is] that there are some statutes five or more justices ... think are more
or less good ideas, and others that five or more justices think are more or less
bad ideas; and that those justices will go to any
(purportedly doctrinal) port in a
261
storm to reach the results they think sensible.,

261

See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 238.
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